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Abstract
This paper empirically analyzes both economic and non-economic determinants of attitudes
toward immigrants, within and across countries. The two individual-level survey data sets
used, covering a wide range of developed and developing countries, make it possible to test for
interactive eﬀects between individual characteristics and country-level attributes. The paper
identiﬁes and investigates a strong empirical regularity concerning the relationship between
individual skill and attitudes toward immigrants. I ﬁnd that individuals with higher levels of
skill are more likely to be pro-immigration in high per capita GDP countries and less likely
in low per capita GDP countries. Additional results, based on a smaller sample of countries,
suggest a labor-market explanation for this cross-country pattern. The variation across countries
in the correlation between skill and preferences appears to be related to diﬀerences in the skill
composition of natives relative to immigrants across destination economies. This ﬁnding is
consistent with the predictions of the Heckscher-Ohlin model, in the absence of factor-price-
insensitivity, and of the factor-proportions-analysis model. Finally, non-economic variables also
appear to be correlated with immigration attitudes but they do not seem to alter signiﬁcantly
t h er e s u l t so nt h ee c o n o m i ce x p l a n a t i o n s .
JEL classiﬁcation: F22, F1.
Keywords: International Migration, Political Economy, Immigration Preferences, Trade Pref-
erences.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Are attitudes toward foreigners inﬂuenced by economic considerations or are they driven exclu-
sively by non-economic issues? Do individuals feel threatened by the labor-market competition
of foreigners? Are people concerned about security and cultural issues? More generally, who is
against immigration, why, and in which countries?
I address these questions by empirically analyzing attitudes toward immigrants within and
across countries, using two individual-level survey data sets.1 I investigate both economic and non-
economic explanations of preference formation and relate the results on the economic determinants
to standard trade and labor-economics theories of immigration.
I ﬁnd evidence that both sets of factors, economic and non-economic ones, are important. In a
wide range of countries, attitudes toward immigrants appear to be related to labor-market concerns,
security and cultural considerations, as well as individual feelings toward political refugees and
illegal immigration. In particular my analysis reveals that, controlling for non-economic factors,
the economic variables play a key and robust role in preference formation over immigration policy.
My results are consistent with the predictions of standard economic models and reject a view of
the world in which only non-economic considerations shape attitudes toward foreigners.
There are three main motivations behind this type of analysis. First, individual-level opinions
on immigration oﬀer indirect information about the distributional impact of factor movements, as
perceived by the public. Controlling for non-economic determinants, it is possible to test whether
these preferences are consistent with the eﬀect of immigration on individual returns, as predicted
by standard economic models. The main focus of this paper is on models that explain preferences
in terms of individuals’ and countries’ factor endowments, the Heckscher-Ohlin trade model and
the factor-proportions-analysis labor model. The value of this approach, based on individual atti-
tudes, is that it provides new ground for testing the income-distribution predictions of theories of
immigration.
Another reason why it is interesting to analyze immigration attitudes is that they are likely to be
a primary determinant of international migration ﬂows. Individual preferences shape the demand
side of immigration-policy decisions which are also aﬀected, on the supply side, by policymakers’
preferences and the institutional structure of government (Rodrik 1995). Immigration policies, in
turn, are likely to be a major factor explaining the recent evolution of labor movements. The size
of immigrant ﬂows depends on both the host country’s demand for immigrants (i.e., immigration
policies) and migrants’ decisions to move, according to political and economic incentives. Empirical
evidence suggests that the economic forces driving the supply side of international immigration —
cross-country wage and income diﬀerentials, reduced transport, communication and information
costs, opportunities for risk diversiﬁcation — have become stronger in the last decades. Restrictive
policies, then, most likely explain the relatively small scale of international immigration (Faini
2001).2
Finally, there is yet another reason to look at individual attitudes toward immigrants. Recent
1I will use the terms attitudes and preferences interchangeably in the text. By either term, I mean individual
stated opinions, which determine how the respondent would vote on a certain issue.
2The comment on the small size of immigrant ﬂows is relative to the past (nineteenth century) and to other
globalization forces such as trade ﬂows, as is explained later on.
2years have witnessed a remarkable push toward globalization. However, there are noticeable diﬀer-
ences in the magnitude of changes in volumes of trade, international capital ﬂows and immigration
(Findlay and O’Rourke 2002 and Obstfeld and Taylor 2002). For example, the extraordinary in-
crease in trade volumes in the post WWII era has not been matched by a parallel rise in labor
ﬂows. Domestic policies have been characterized by an evident asymmetry with respect to trade
and capital movements on the one hand, and immigration on the other (Bilal et al. 1998, Faini
2002, and Rodrik 2001).3 Individual preferences can reveal whether this diﬀerence in policy out-
comes originates from a diﬀerent attitude of the public toward these policies. The data sets used
in this paper make it possible to compare individual-level opinions on trade with attitudes toward
immigration policy, both within and across countries.
Pro-immigration attitudes appear to vary systematically according to the demographic and
socio-economic background of the individual. I investigate the heterogeneity across countries in the
impact of individual-level variables. I ﬁnd that there exists a great deal of cross-country variation
in terms of the correlation between the level of individual skill and attitudes in favor of immigrants.
I identify a robust empirical regularity related to these two variables. The richer the host country
is, the more positive is the impact of schooling on favorable opinions about immigrants. Individual
skill is positively correlated with pro-immigration preferences in high per capita GDP countries and
negatively correlated with pro-immigration preferences in low per capita GDP countries.
Additional results, based on a smaller sample of countries, suggest a labor-market explana-
tion for this cross-country pattern. The correlation between the individual level of education and
pro-immigration attitudes appears to be related to the skill composition of natives relative to immi-
grants, which varies across destination economies. This result suggests that individual attitudes are
aﬀected by the change, in the host country, of the relative supply of skilled to unskilled labor, due
to the inﬂow of foreigners. My ﬁndings are consistent with the predictions of the Heckscher-Ohlin
model, in the absence of factor-price-insensitivity, and of the factor-proportions-analysis model.
In both factor-endowments models, individual attitudes toward foreigners depend on the impact
on factor prices of immigration-induced changes in relative factor supplies. The robustness of the
factor-endowments explanation is conﬁrmed by additional results based on individual-level data on
occupation. Individuals in occupations which experience a bigger increase in relative supply due to
immigration, i.e. with a higher ratio of immigrants to natives, are less likely to be pro-immigration.
I next analyze correlation patterns between attitudes toward immigrants and individual answers
to questions on non-economic issues. The inclusion in the empirical model of these additional
regressors allows me to test the robustness of the empirical regularity previously observed. Non-
economic factors do not seem to alter signiﬁcantly the results on the economic explanations. After
controlling for how individuals feel about the impact of immigration on crime rates and on cultural
and national identity, and taking into account people’s racist attitudes and their feelings about
political refugees and illegal immigration, I still ﬁnd evidence of the same cross-country pattern, in
terms of the correlation between individual skill and pro-immigration attitudes.
Finally, while preferences on immigration and trade are positively correlated, individuals appear
3The policy stances toward goods trade and labor ﬂows have been characterized, historically, by a reversal in
opposite directions. Immigration policies have experienced a tightening in the last century relative to the previous
one, starting after WWI. Trade policies have been increasingly liberalized across the two centuries (except in the
interwar period), especially after WWII (Faini 2002).
3to be, on average, more pro-trade than pro-immigration. My empirical results point out that one
important source of this diﬀerence in attitudes is the cleavage in trade preferences, absent in
immigration attitudes, between individuals working in traded sectors and individuals working in
non-traded sectors.
Various papers have analyzed preferences on immigration policy but, in most cases, they have
been characterized by the use of indirect measures of people’s attitudes or by the focus on a single
country, for example the United States and Great Britain.4 In addition, few empirical works have
related their results to the predictions of theoretical models. This paper combines three elements
of the previous literature: the use of a direct measure of individual immigration preferences, the
comparison of attitudes both within and across diﬀerent countries, and the interpretation of the
empirical results in terms of the predictions of theoretical models.
Indirect measures of policy opinions, such as those based on voting and lobbying, are imperfect
measures of preferences, because they are jointly determined by individual attitudes and the insti-
tutional structure of government (Scheve and Slaughter 2001b, 2001c). In a cross-country work,
such as in this paper, this would be a serious shortcoming, since institutions are certainly diﬀerent
across nations.5 To get around this problem, I use two individual-level data sources: the 1995
National Identity module of the International Social Survey Programme and the third wave of the
World Value Survey data set, carried out in 1995-1997. The ﬁrst source contains data on 23 coun-
tries, mostly developed economies, while the second data source gives information on more than
40 nations, most of which are developing countries. Where possible, I test the robustness of the
results using both data sets. The cross-country dimension of the two surveys allows me to test for
interactive eﬀects between individual-level characteristics and country-level variables. This empir-
ical strategy makes it easier to overcome interpretational ambiguities that arise in single-country
studies or in multi-country analyses that do not explore cross-country heterogeneity of coeﬃcients.
From a methodological point of view, the empirical paper most related to my work is Scheve and
Slaughter (2001b), who analyze individual preferences on immigration policy in the United States
using the 1992 National Election Studies survey. The focus of their work is on determinants of
immigration preferences working through the labor market. As in my paper, Scheve and Slaughter
use a direct measure of individual opinions and closely relate the empirical analysis to the results
of theoretical models. The main diﬀerences between Scheve and Slaughter’s study and my analysis
is that I adopt a cross-country perspective, which is richer in terms of theoretical predictions, and
I focus on both economic and non-economic determinants of immigration preferences.
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the data sets. Section 3 focuses
on economic explanations of attitudes, while Section 4 introduces non-economic determinants of
preferences. In the last part of the paper, Section 5, I analyze immigration preferences and attitudes
toward free trade in comparative terms and, in Section 6, I conclude.
4The empirical literature on individual preferences over immigration policy includes some works focusing on the
United States (Citrin et al. 1997, Espenshade and Hempstead 1996, Kessler 2001, and Scheve and Slaughter 2001b)
and on Great Britain (Dustmann and Preston 2001a and 2001b) and a few papers with a cross-country perspective
(Bauer et al. 2000, Brücker et al. 2001, Chiswick and Hatton 2002, Gang et al. 2002, and O’Rourke and Sinnott
2003). The literature also oﬀers historical accounts of the political economy of immigration restrictions at the turn
of last century (Goldin 1994 and Timmer and Williamson 1996).
5That is, using indirect measures, it is not clear whether the variation in outcomes is due to diﬀerences in attitudes
or in institutions.
42D a t a
This paper uses two individual-level survey data sets - that contain responses to questions on im-
migration - and additional data on international migration and on the characteristics of destination
and origin countries of immigrant ﬂows. The ﬁrst survey with information on immigration atti-
tudes comes from the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP). I use the 1995 ISSP National
Identity module (ISSP-NI) covering more than 20,000 respondents from 23 countries, including the
United States, Canada, Japan and several Western European countries. The survey also includes
a few Eastern European countries and one developing country, the Philippines.6 For each individ-
ual, the data set contains socio-economic and demographic background variables and a variety of
opinions on topics such as immigration and trade policies, patriotism, and national identity.
I focus on survey answers to the question: “There are diﬀerent opinions about immigrants from
other countries living in (respondent’s country). (By “immigrants” we mean people who come
to settle in (respondent’s country).) Do you think the number of immigrants to (respondent’s
country) nowadays should be: (a) reduced a lot, (b) reduced a little, (c) remain the same as it is,
(d) increased a little, or (e) increased a lot”.7 Besides the ﬁve ordered answers, the survey format
also allows for “can’t choose” (CC) and “not available” (NA) responses.
The ISSP-NI data set includes a host of other questions on immigration-related issues. I focus
on the question above because, in the theoretical section, I will consider the comparative-statics
eﬀects of changes in the number of immigrants. However, in various speciﬁcations, I use responses to
other immigration-related questions as explanatory variables. For example, respondents are asked
whether they think that immigrants increase crime rates and whether they believe that immigrants
make the country more open to new ideas and cultures. This information is useful, because it
allows me to control for some important non-economic determinants of immigration preferences.
I recode respondents’ answers (1=“reduced a lot”, to 5=“increased a lot”), and I call this
variable Immig Opinion. I also create a dichotomous variable, Immig Opinion Dummy,e q u a lt o
one for individuals who express pro-immigration attitudes (i.e., for those replying “increased a
little” or “increased a lot”).8 Country-level summary statistics of the two dependent variables and
of the other immigration-related questions are presented in Data Appendix 1 and 2.
Immigration opinions across countries are characterized by very large fractions of “can’t choose”
responses. As Appendix A.2 explains, omitting “can’t choose” responses may result in a selection
bias. Given that I ﬁnd no evidence that selection is an issue (see Appendix A.2), I restrict the
sample to individuals who express an opinion and I use Immig Opinion and Immig Opinion Dummy
as dependent variables. Since ordered probit results are harder to summarize, I will present and
discuss the results from probit estimation based on the dichotomous variable.9
To control for each individual’s socio-economic background, I use information from ISSP-NI
6See Data Appendix 1 for a list of the countries covered in the ISSP-NI data set.
7A similar question has been analyzed in most of the empirical literature on individual immigration preferences
(Espenshade and Hempstead 1996, Scheve and Slaughter 2001b, Citrin et al. 1997, and Kessler 2001).
8I exclude non-nationals from the sample. “Can’t choose” and NA responses are coded as missing values for both
variables.
9Estimates of the ordered probit coeﬃcients, using either one of the two data sets, are consistent with the results
based on the dichotomous variable and are available upon request. Similarly, my results don’t change when I keep
CC and NA responses.
5questions on age, gender, parents’ foreign citizenship, years of education, area of residence (rural vs
urban), subjective social class, political aﬃliation with the right and trade union membership. I also
use each respondent’s individual real income as a basic indicator of individual economic status.10
A measure of individual skill is constructed from data on years of education and is used to test the
implications of the factor-endowments models. Survey answers on individuals’ occupation are also
employed, to test the robustness of the results related to the factor-endowments models. Responses
on topics such as national pride and identity, multiculturalism, illegal immigration and political
refugees are used to control for non-economic determinants of immigration policy preferences.11
The ISSP-NI data set mostly covers high and middle-income economies. I complement the
results from this source with the ﬁndings based on the third wave of the World Value Survey
(WVS), carried out in 1995-1997. The WVS data set includes more than 50,000 respondents
from 44 mostly developing economies. The immigration question in the WVS asks the following:
“How about people from other countries coming here to work. Which one of the following do
you think the government should do? (a) Let anyone come who wants to? (b) Let people come
as long as there are jobs available? (c) Place strict limits on the number of foreigners who can
come here? (d) Prohibit people coming here from other countries? (e) Don’t know.” I transformed
answers to the WVS immigration question into two dependent variables: an ordered variable, Immig
Opinion (WVS), and a dichotomous variable, Immig Opinion Dummy (WVS), both constructed
after excluding “Don’t know” responses from the sample.12 Again, for expositional clarity, I will
present and discuss the results based on the dichotomous variable, whose country-level summary
statistics are included in Data Appendix 6. The tables at the end of the paper — based on either
the ISSP-NI or the WVS data sets — present the probit marginal eﬀects and corresponding z values
of each regressor, holding all other variables at their mean. All the regressions include country
ﬁxed eﬀects, to control for additive country-speciﬁc unobserved eﬀects, and have standard errors
adjusted for clustering on country.
The WVS, like the ISSP-NI data set, contains information at the individual level on the socio-
economic background of each respondent and on his labor market characteristics. Thus, in both
data sets, it is possible to identify both stated immigration policy preferences and individual char-
acteristics that explain immigration opinions in standard economic models.
Individual-level information from both data sources is combined with outside data on immi-
gration ﬂows and stocks from the International Migration Statistics data set for OECD countries
(OECD 1997). Immigrants’ ﬂows numbers are based on the OECD’s Continuous Reporting System
on Migration (SOPEMI). Data on the origin and labor market characteristics of immigrants’ stocks
is based on survey and census data from Eurostat and national governments.
In particular, in this paper I use statistics on immigrant inﬂows into OECD countries in the
10Please see footnote at the end of Table 1 for deﬁnitions of these variables.
11The details about the construction of these variables are given in a related paper on trade policy preferences,
Mayda and Rodrik (2003), and in the Tables and Data Appendix.
12I exclude from the analysis people who were not born in the country where the survey is carried out. I then
recode respondents’ answers to construct the variable Immig Opinion (WVS), which ranges from 1=“prohibit people
coming here from other countries” to 4=“Let anyone come who wants to”. Immig Opinion Dummy (WVS) is deﬁned
as follows: Immig Opinion Dummy (WVS) =1, if Immig Opinion (WVS)=3 or 4; 0, if Immig Opinion (WVS)=1 or
2. See Appendix A.2 for how I deal with “Don’t Know” responses.
6period 1990-1995; on native and immigrant populations by level of education in 199513;a n do n
native and immigrant populations by occupation in 1995, according to the 1988 International
Standard Classiﬁcation of Occupations (ISCO).14
Data on religious adherence in the host country and in the main countries of origin of foreigners
come from Barro and McCleary (2002), while statistics on language in the destination and source
countries of immigrants and on the colonial relationship between pairs of countries come from Glick
and Rose’s website.15 Finally, data on exchange rates, purchasing power parity conversion factors
and population come from the 2001 World Development Indicators CD-ROM, developed by the
World Bank. Tables in the Data Appendix contain country-level summary statistics of the main
v a r i a b l e su s e di nt h ep a p e r .
3 Economic Determinants of Individual Attitudes
Most likely, both economic and non-economic factors shape individual preferences over immigration
policy. Among the economic determinants, one of the most important is likely to be the impact
of immigrants on natives’ returns through factor markets. Focusing on two factors, skilled and
unskilled labor, this eﬀect will take place in labor markets. The main results of my analysis are
related to this determinant.16 By considering this aspect of preference formation, I investigate
whether individuals reveal, through their attitudes, a self-interest maximizing or economically-
rational behavior, as assumed in the models of Section 3.2.
The variation in attitudes toward foreigners may also depend on diﬀerences in individual per-
ceptions of the economy-wide beneﬁts and costs of immigration. I test the robustness of the results
based on maximization of individual utility to this alternative explanation. Finally, another im-
portant economic factor shaping people’s stance is the perceived ﬁscal impact of immigration on
the welfare state. In some receiving countries immigrants are likely to belong to the bottom of
the income distribution, which makes them probable beneﬁciaries of costly welfare programs. My
results shed light on this issue as well.
Non-economic factors aﬀecting immigration opinions include security issues as well as national-
identity and cultural considerations. Racist feelings also are likely to shape attitudes toward for-
eigners. Finally, individual beliefs about civil and human rights - speciﬁcally concerning political
refugees - and the attitude toward illegal immigration are additional important elements of people’s
opinions about foreigners. I will consider such non-economic determinants in Section 4.
13Education levels are coded according to the International Standard Classiﬁcation of Education (ISCED): 1. less
than ﬁrst stage of 2nd level (ISCED 00, 01 and 02); 2. completed 2nd stage of 2nd level (ISCED 03 and 04); 3.
completed 3rd level (ISCED 05 and over); 4. other general education, not applicable and no answer. ISCED level 02
usually refers to a ninth grade education.
14Occupations by 1988 ISCO are classiﬁed as follows: 1. Armed forces; 2. Legislators and managers; 3. Profession-
als; 4. Technicians; 5. Clerks; 6. Service and sales workers; 7. Agricultural and ﬁshery workers; 8. Craft and related
trades workers; 9. Plant and machine operators; 10. Elementary occupations.
15Data on religious aﬃliation from Barro and McCleary (2002) use ﬁgures for the 1980s from the ﬁrst edition of
the World Christian Encyclopedia (Barrett 1982).
16Since the models I will present in Section 3.2 assume full employment, the impact of immigration on natives in
factor-markets occurs through changes in factor prices.
7Before narrowing the focus of the analysis, it is interesting to look at the most basic patterns in
the two surveys. Table 1a, based on the ISSP-NI data set, and Table 1b, based on the WVS ﬁgures,
present the results from a benchmark model of immigration attitudes, whose focus is on the social,
demographic and economic background of each respondent.17 As both sets of results show, older
people favor immigration restrictions, as do individuals living in more rural areas and in smaller
towns.18 More educated individuals and respondents with family ties to non-nationals are more
open to immigration. The gender eﬀect, quite strong in the ISSP-NI data set, disappears using the
WVS statistics.19 Aﬃliation with more conservative political parties is negatively correlated with
pro-immigration preferences, in both sets of ﬁndings. Using the ISSP-NI data set, individual (real)
income, social class, and trade union membership do not have a signiﬁcant impact on immigration
preferences. On the other hand, relative income positively aﬀects attitudes toward foreigners in the
WVS sample of countries.
One of the most robust ﬁndings in the benchmark model, estimated with both the ISSP-NI and
the WVS data sets, is a signiﬁcant and positive impact of education on pro-immigration attitudes.
The variables used in Tables 1a and 1b as measures of schooling, years of education (in the ISSP-NI
data set) and educational attainment (in the WVS data set), are among the most often employed
in the labor and growth literatures as indicators of levels of skill. Thus, these initial results reveal
that, on average, in the sample of countries considered, there is a positive and signiﬁcant correlation
between individual skill and pro-immigration preferences. In the following empirical analysis, I will
qualify this result.
In the next section I address the following question: Does the correlation between individual
socio-economic characteristics and immigration attitudes vary across countries? I ﬁnd empirical
evidence of cross-country heterogeneity with respect to the impact of individual skill on immigration
attitudes and investigate what explains this pattern (Section 3.1). A range of empirical tests shows
that the eﬀect of individual skill is, in fact, working through the labor market. I therefore look
into the labor-market predictions of two factor-endowments models, which I present in Section 3.2.
Additional empirical analysis in Section 3.3 tests more directly the theoretical ﬁndings and produces
results consistent with them. I next use individual-level data on occupation to examine whether
individuals in occupations with a higher fraction of immigrants to natives are more likely to be
anti-immigration (Section 3.4). By interpreting each occupation as a diﬀerent factor of production,
this analysis allows me to further test the robustness of the factor-endowments explanation.
3.1 Does the correlation between individual socio-economic characteristics and
immigration attitudes vary across countries?
In the benchmark model, I constrain the coeﬃcients on individual characteristics to be equal for
all countries in the samples. However, the impact of socio-economic and demographicv a r i a b l e s
17The regressors included are age, male, rural (area of residence: rural vs urban), parents’ foreign citizenship, years
of education, (log of) real income, political aﬃliation with the right, upper social class, trade union membership (in
ISSP); age, male, educational attainment, upper social class, political aﬃliation with the right, town size, relative
income, national pride (1) and national pride (2) (in WVS).
18The statistical signiﬁcance of these results changes across speciﬁcations.
19The gender eﬀect disappears using the ISSP-NI data set too, once I control for individual occupation (Table 3).
8on immigration attitudes is likely to diﬀer across economies. I take advantage of the panel-data
structure of the two data sets and investigate cross-country heterogeneity of coeﬃcients. I ﬁnd that,
while the eﬀect of most variables does not vary, the impact of individual skill diﬀers considerably
across countries.20
Before presenting the results of the econometric analysis, it is informative to look at the graphs in
Figure 1, which oﬀer preliminary evidence on the main result in the paper. I choose three countries
in the sample, with diﬀerent levels of per capita GDP. For each country, I plot the percentages
of individuals who are pro-immigration by education group. In the United States, a high-income
country, the more advanced the education category, the bigger the fraction of individuals who are
pro-immigration. I ﬁnd the same pattern for the other high per-capita-GDP countries in the two
samples (not shown). The graph for one of the lowest-income countries in the data sets, Nigeria,
looks quite diﬀerent: the higher the education group, the lower the fraction of individuals who are
pro-immigration. Finally, for a middle-income country in the sample, such as Uruguay, the fractions
of pro-immigration individuals do not appear to vary signiﬁcantly across education groups.21
I next present the results from probit estimation, which allows me to control for each individual’s
socio-economic background. I ﬁrst estimate the model separately for each economy.
The country-speciﬁc regressions show that there is a great deal of cross-country variation in
terms of the correlation between individual skill and attitudes. Figures 2, 3a and 3b summarize the
evidence across countries. Figure 2 for the ISSP-NI sample presents the country-speciﬁc marginal
eﬀect of years of education on pro-immigration preferences (y axis) as a function of per capita
GDP of the destination economy (x axis).22 Figures 3a and 3b for the WVS data set are similarly
constructed.23 All three graphs show a positive relationship between per capita GDP of the host
economy and the size of the country-speciﬁc impact of individual skill on attitudes in favor of
foreigners.
I can gain additional insight on this pattern by, again, pooling all countries together in a
single regression. As before, I use per capita GDP as a summary measure of each destination
economy to diﬀerentiate the eﬀect of schooling by host country. Speciﬁcally, I include in the model
speciﬁcation both the direct eﬀect of individual skill and an interaction variable, education*gdp,
which is the product of the education measure times each country’s (log) per capita GDP in 1995
(in international dollars). Column (1) of Table 2a presents the marginal eﬀects of this speciﬁcation,
estimated using the ISSP-NI data set.
20In particular, with the ISSP-NI data the correlation between immigration attitudes and, respectively, age, gender,
parents’ foreign citizenship, real income is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent across countries, when I use per capita GDP (in
1995, PPP-adjusted) as a summary measure of each country. Instead, the impact of political aﬃliation with the right
varies according to the level of national income.
21The per capita GDP levels in 1995, PPP-adjusted, of the United States, Nigeria, and Uruguay are respectively
and approximately: 28,000; 825; and 8000 international dollars.
22I estimate a separate probit model for each country. In Figure 2 the y axis measures, for each country, the
estimated marginal eﬀect of years of education on the probability of being pro-immigration, holding all other regressors
at their mean value. I control for age, male, and education.
23I nb o t hF i g u r e s3 aa n d3 b ,f o re a c hc o u n t r y ,t h e y axis measures the estimated marginal eﬀect of the highest
education level attained on the probability of being pro-immigration, holding all other regressors at their mean value.
I control for age, male, country of birth, upper social class, political aﬃliation with the right, and education. The
ﬁrst graph refers to the whole sample of countries, the second one only to countries with 1995 per capita GDP (PPP)
less than 15,000 international dollars.
9I ﬁnd strong evidence of a reversal in the impact of the individual skill level on immigration
preferences. Individual skill appears to be positively correlated with pro-immigration preferences
in high per capita GDP countries and negatively correlated with pro-immigration preferences in
low per capita GDP countries.
In particular, the estimates for years of education (-0.0454, signiﬁcant at the 1% level) and
education*gdp (0.0054, signiﬁcant at the 1% level) imply that any country with per capita GDP
in 1995 (PPP-adjusted) lower than approximately $4480 is characterized by a negative correlation
between skill and pro-immigration preferences, while individuals from countries with per capita
GDP above this threshold are more likely to be in favor of immigration the more educated they
are. These results are consistent with the empirical regularity uncovered by the country-speciﬁc
regressions and summarized in Figures 2, 3a and 3b. In addition, I will show that these ﬁndings
are very robust, using various speciﬁcations and diﬀerent skill measures, in both the ISSP-NI and
the WVS data sets.
In testing the robustness of my main result, I investigate several empirical issues. I ﬁrst question
whether the coeﬃcient on schooling is really capturing the impact of individual skill, i.e. whether
the estimated eﬀect is working through the labor market. I next check that the main results are
robust to changes in the samples of countries considered. Finally, in Sections 3.2 and 3.3, I explore
which aspect of the destination country I am accounting for, when I use per capita GDP as a
summary measure of its economy.
Table 2a, based on the ISSP-NI data set, and Table 2b, based on the WVS ﬁgures, present the
results of various robustness checks.
Both skill measures (years of education and educational attainment) are likely to be correlated
with individual characteristics which have an impact on immigration preferences. Such omitted
variables could bias the estimates and drive the main result. To (partly) address this problem,
in regressions (2)-(5) in Table 2a I include additional controls, relative to the core speciﬁcation
of column (1). In regression (2), the inclusion of the variable political aﬃliation with the right
does not considerably aﬀect the main cross-country pattern. The individual likelihood of being
pro-immigration still increases with education in high per capita GDP countries, but it decreases
with it if the destination economy is poor.
This ﬁnding does not change after controlling for the (log of) individual real income in column
(3). The impact of the latter variable is not signiﬁcant and does not alter considerably the main
result. This rules out the possibility that the education measure is only picking up the eﬀect of
economic status. In addition, by controlling for total individual income, I can in part account
for ownership of other factors of production owned by the respondent, like capital.24 Ia l s oc h e c k
whether the non-linearity in the impact of education is driven by the reversal of the eﬀect of in-
dividual income. I ﬁnd no evidence of this in regression (4), which shows that it is the impact of
education, and not of income, that is non-linear and signiﬁcant. Finally, since individual contribu-
tions to and beneﬁts from the welfare state are usually proportional to individuali n c o m e ,r e s u l t s
in columns (3) and (4) are also evidence against a welfare-story explanation of attitudes.
I further investigate the possibility that the eﬀect of education is working through channels other
than the labor market. In the ISSP-NI data set, I systematically test the robustness of the results
24The two data sets do not contain direct information on individual capital ownership.
10based on years of education by controlling for the following two regressors: Immig Crime,w h i c h
represents the respondent’s perceived impact of immigration on crime rates and Immig Culture,
which quantiﬁes the respondent’s perceived cultural eﬀect of immigration. Security issues and
cultural considerations are likely to be among the most important non-economic determinants of
preferences which are aﬀected by schooling. By comparing two individuals who feel the same in
terms of these issues, I hope to better isolate the economic channel, which links individual skill to
immigration preferences through the labor market.25 The results in regression (5), which controls
for Immig Crime and Immig Culture, still show the same pattern as in column (1): better skilled
individuals are more likely to be pro-immigration in richer countries, and less likely in poorer
countries.
I next verify my results by making use of a diﬀerent measure of individual skill, which is less
vulnerable to omitted-variables problems. In column (6), in place of years of education, I employ
a second indicator of skill, skilISCO, which uses information on occupation based on the 1988
ISCO classiﬁcation.26 skilISCO exploits the skill-based nature of the 1988 ISCO categorization
of occupations.27 As O’Rourke and Sinnott (2001) emphasize, it is a particularly good-quality
indicator of individual skill since, in addition to formal schooling, it captures the role of on-the-job
training and of the nature of the work. Using skilISCO and its interaction with each country’s
(log) per capita GDP in 1995, I ﬁnd evidence of the same pattern as before.
As a ﬁnal robustness check, to gain more evidence on whether the impact of schooling is indeed
working through the labor market, I follow Scheve and Slaughter (2001b) in running two separate
regressions, one for the subsample of individuals who belong to the labor force and the other for
those who do not.28 I expect to see no eﬀect of education for individuals out of the labor force if
the correlation between schooling and preferences is in fact driven by labor-market causes.
T h ee s t i m a t e si nT a b l e2 cc o n ﬁrm that the impact of education on immigration attitudes is in
fact related to the labor-market channel. Compared to the full sample, the preferences-skill pattern
is more pronounced in the labor-force subsample and, on the other hand, any correlation is absent
(the estimates are considerably smaller and not signiﬁcant) in the group of individuals out of the
25It is possible that the coeﬃcient estimates on education - in the regressions which control for Immig Crime and
Immig Culture - are missing some of the eﬀect of individual skill. That is, it may be that I am overcontrolling, given
that these variables are not exogenous. An individual may be against immigrants for economic reasons and, as a
consequence, have a negative opinion of them from a cultural and security point of view. Citrin et al. (1997) notice
that “...in-group solidarity and out-group hostility themselves are often thought to change in response to material
threat” (p.862).
26The idea to construct this measure using the International Labour Organisation’s 1988 ISCO coding scheme comes
from O’Rourke and Sinnott (2001), who use the same ISSP-NI data set in their analysis of trade policy preferences.
1988 ISCO matches each occupation with one of four skill levels, which are deﬁned according to the level of education
(by ISCED classiﬁcation) and to the extent of informal training and experience required to perform a job.
27skilISCO equals one if the 1988 ISCO occupation code is 2 (legislators and managers), 3 (professionals) and
4 (technicians); it equals zero if the 1988 ISCO occupation code is 5 (clerks), 6 (service and sales workers), 7
(agricultural and ﬁshery workers), 8 (craft and related trades workers), 9 (plant and machine operators) and 10
(elementary occupations).
28The labor force subsample includes individuals who are full-time employed, part-time employed, less than part-
time employed (main job); unemployed. The out-of-the labor force subsample includes individuals who are retired;
housewifes (men), in home duties; permanently disabled, sick; others, not in labour force, not working. I exclude
students from the sample since their number of years of education does not reﬂect their expected future skill.
11labor force.29
In Figure 4, I use data from the ISSP-NI data set and I draw regression lines as in Figures 2, 3a
and 3b. The regression lines in Figure 4 refer to the two subsamples of individuals who, respectively,
are and are not in the labor force. In particular, after dividing the sample into the two groups, I
separately estimate the country-speciﬁc marginal eﬀect of years of education on pro-immigration
preferences for the subsample of individuals who are in the labor force and, next, for the subsample
of individuals outside the labor force. Each line in Figure 4 gives the ﬁtted values of the regression
of these marginal eﬀects on per capita GDP in 1995. Figure 4 clearly shows that the correlation
between the impact of skill on attitudes and the country’s level of per capita income disappears for
individuals outside the labor force. This is another piece of evidence in favor of the labor-market
interpretation of the cross-country pattern.
The empirical regularity is also robust to excluding from the sample the only developing country
in the ISSP-NI data set (the Philippines) in column (7) and to dropping observations from low-
income countries (Poland, Bulgaria, Russia, Philippines, Latvia) in column (8).
Finally, my estimates do not change considerably (not shown) when I control for Immig Econ-
omy, which measures the impact of immigration on the country’s economy, as perceived by the
individual. Economy-wide beneﬁts and costs of immigration appear to be important, but they
do not drive the results on individual skill (the latter ones relate to the distributional impact of
immigration).
The results from Table 2b, which are based on the WVS ﬁgures, conﬁrm the strength of the
main result found with the ISSP-NI data set. I use survey questions to construct four diﬀerent
measures of individual skill: the highest education level attained by the individual, the age at which
the respondent has completed education, and two skill measures based, respectively, on occupation
data for the individual and for the chief-wage-earner in the household.30 Using any of the four
indicators of skill, the impact of education on immigration preferences once again is positive for
high-income countries and negative for low-income countries. Hence, Table 2b suggests that the
previous estimates, based on the ISSP-NI data set, are not driven by the particular sample of
countries there considered. Indeed, the WVS data set mostly includes developing countries and
thus complements the ISSP-NI sample.
3.2 Factor-Endowments Models of Immigration-Policy Attitudes
The empirical results, so far, reveal a robust empirical regularity - a positive and signiﬁcant corre-
lation between per capita GDP and the size of the impact of individual skill on pro-immigration
preferences - and evidence that the eﬀect is working through the labor market. I now look at the
predictions of two economic models - the Heckscher-Ohlin (HO) model and the factor-proportions-
analysis (FPA) model - as regards the impact of labor movements on individual attitudes working
29Table 2c, based on the ISSP-NI data set, mirrors Table 4 (constructed using US data) in Scheve and Slaughter
(2001b). Notice that the results in Table 2c are robust to changes in the sample of countries considered, as I ﬁnd
evidence of the same patterns when I use the WVS data set.
30I consider the second measure — the age at which the respondent has completed education — the least reliable one
of all, given that in some countries the duration of schooling required to reach a given level of skill is higher, because
of deﬁciencies in the education system.
12through labor markets. In terms of the distributional eﬀect of immigration, the interaction between
individual factor type and each country’s factor endowments plays a key role in both the HO model
and the FPA model. Hence, I will refer to both models as factor-endowments models.
The HO model is one of the workhorse models of international trade. The model focuses on
small open economies, characterized by constant returns to scale and perfect competition in each
sector.31 At least two goods are assumed to be produced, so that trade can take place between
countries. In addition, there exists a national labor market for each factor of production, that is,
factors are perfectly mobile within country borders.
T h ek e yf e a t u r eo ft h eH Om o d e li sd i ﬀerences across economies in relative factor endowments.
Through trade, each country either exports or imports the services of a factor of production ac-
cording to whether it is abundantly or poorly endowed with it, relative to the rest of the world.
The predictions of the HO model, with regard to the impact of immigration on factor rates of
return, depend on a key condition that relates the number of internationally-traded goods produced
in the country (n) to the number of primary factors of production (m). If n ≥ m, ceteris paribus
as u ﬃciently small increase of a factor’s supply does not have any eﬀect on factor rates of return:
factor-price-insensitivity holds. If the shock to the factor’s supply is substantial or if n<m ,
a change in a factor endowment changes factor prices. Thus, in the HO model, the impact of
immigration on factors’ rates of return depends on the extent of diversiﬁcation of the country’s
production, in terms of internationally-traded goods, and on the size of the factor supply shock.
To gain intuition regarding these predictions, I present a simple model that suits the empirical
analysis in the paper: the 3×2 HO model with and without diversiﬁcation. (See Appendix A.1 about
factor-price-insensitivity in the m × n HO model.) The 3 × 2 HO model encompasses both factor-
endowments models since, in terms of labor-market predictions, the case without diversiﬁcation
(one-good model) corresponds to the factor-proportions-analysis (FPA) model described in Borjas
(1999a).
Consider a small open economy with three factors (skilled labor, unskilled labor, and capital)
which produces two goods. Capital is assumed to be internationally mobile. That is, the supply of
capital is elastic and the rental rate of capital always equals the international one (r = r∗), so that
dr =0 . The native workforce has a fraction b of skilled workers and a fraction (1 − b) of unskilled
workers (N = b ∗ N +( 1− b) ∗ N). The immigrant workforce has a fraction β of skilled workers
and a fraction (1 − β) of unskilled workers (M = β ∗ M +( 1− β) ∗ M).32 The total labor force is
L = N + M.
Two sets of conditions hold in equilibrium on the production side, the production equilibrium
conditions — price is equal to unit cost in each sector — and the set of factors’ full-employment
conditions:
31For what matters in this paper - i.e., the sensitivity of factors’ prices to changes in factors’ endowments - it is
not important whether trade is free or if, instead, there exist some barriers to free trade (like tariﬀso rq u o t a s )w h i c h
create a wedge between international prices and domestic prices.
32I assume that immigrants only own skilled and unskilled labor. Therefore immigration directly changes the
destination country’s supply of skilled and unskilled labor. Immigration also induces changes in the supply of capital
but, in this paper, I will assume that any immigration-induced change in the supply of capital is given by changes in
capital owned by the rest of the world.











where pi and yi,i=1 ,2 are respectively prices and quantities produced of each good and bi(·),i=
1,2 are sectors’ unit cost functions, characterized by partial derivatives (with respect to each factor
price) bik(·), k = S,U,K.33 S = bN + βM, U =( 1− b)N +( 1− β)M and K are respectively the
total supply of skilled workers, unskilled workers and capital, and wS,w U and r are respectively
the price of skilled labor, unskilled labor and capital.
Let’s consider the case when the country produces both goods and the immigration shock is
suﬃciently small. Systems (1) and (2) show that factor-price-insensitivity holds: factor prices are
insensitive to changes in factor endowments induced by immigration.34 System (1), in 2 equations
and 2 unknowns (wS,w U,w h i l er always equals r∗), pins down the rates of return to factors.35
Based on (1), unless goods’ prices change in international markets or technology improves, factor
prices do not change. Therefore, a small increase in the number of immigrants (dM > 0)d o e s
not change factor prices (dwS = dwU =0 ), even though it aﬀects the endowment of factors. In
this case, immigration-induced changes in factor supplies only concern system (2) and are absorbed
through Rybczynski eﬀects, with reallocation of factors across sectors.
If the country only produces one good or if the immigration shock is big enough to change which
goods are produced, rates of return to factors change due to immigration.36 In the former case,
without diversiﬁcation, the labor-market predictions of the (open-economy) HO model are the same
as in the (closed-economy) factor-proportions-analysis (FPA) model, which has been widely used
in the labor economics literature (Borjas 1999a, Borjas et al. 1996 and Borjas et al. 1997). One
of the critical assumptions of the FPA model is that there exists a single aggregate output market.
In addition, as in the HO model, a national labor market characterizes every factor of production,
that is factors can move costlessly across economic sectors.
The FPA model predicts that any change in the country’s relative factor endowments has an
impact on factor prices.37 In particular, in the host country, the sign of the derivative of the skilled
(unskilled) wage with respect to M is unambiguously determined by the diﬀerence between b and
33The partial derivatives bik(·) give the cost-minimizing requirement of input k necessary to produce one unit of
good i.
34The case when both goods are produced is such that the number of primary factors of production (excluding
capital, which is internationally mobile) is no greater than the number of goods (n).
35I assume that no factor-intensity reversals occur.
36The intuition about the ﬁrst condition is that, with only one equation in (1), the full-employment conditions are
now necessary to pin down factor prices. The intuition about the second condition is that the equations of system
(1) have now changed (some of them correspond to diﬀerent goods).
37The diﬀerence between the HO model and the FPA model becomes clearer by thinking in terms of the labor
demand curve. In the FPA model, the labor demand curve is downward sloping. In the HO model, the labor demand
c u r v ei ss t i l ld o w n w a r ds l o p i n g ,b u ti ti sa l s oc h a r a c t e r i z e db yﬂat regions, corresponding to the ranges of factors’
endowments for which factor-price-insensitivity holds (Scheve and Slaughter 2001b).
14β, that is the diﬀerence between the fraction of skilled workers in, respectively, the native and the
immigrant workforce (Borjas 1999a):38
dwS
dM
= k1(b − β)
wS
N
,k 1 > 0 (3)
dwU
dM
= k2(b − β)
wU
N
,k 2 < 0 (4)
Hence, the skilled wage is an increasing function of M if (b − β) > 0, a decreasing function of
M if (b−β) < 0, and is independent of M if (b−β)=0 . Intuitively, if (b−β) > 0, immigrants are
less skilled than natives: thus the relative supply of skilled to unskilled labor decreases with the
inﬂow of foreigners and the skilled wage increases. If (b − β) < 0, skilled labor becomes relatively
less scarce after immigration and the rate of return to skill decreases. Finally, if (b − β)=0 ,
immigration-induced changes in factor supplies do not alter the skill composition of the labor force
in the destination country and the structure of factor returns stays the same.
In both factor-endowments models, I assume that individuals in the economy are endowed
with diﬀerent amounts of skilled and unskilled labor and of capital. Income of individual j is
therefore equal to yj = wS · sj + wU · uj + r · kj. Each individual is characterized by the indirect
utility function vj(p1,p 2,y j). If individuals care only about economic self-interest, preferences on
immigration policy will depend on the sign of the derivative
dvj
dM. Individual j will be in favor of an
increase in the number of immigrants (dM > 0)i fa n do n l yi f
dvj
dM ≥ 0 which, given the assumption






The last inequality is satisﬁe di fa n do n l yi f
dyj









· uj ≥ 0. (5)
Inequality (5) shows that the relationship between immigration preferences and individual fac-
tor type (sj and uj) depends on how immigration changes factor prices. If there is diversiﬁcation
in production (n ≥ m) and the supply shock is suﬃciently small, there should be no link between
individual skill and preferences, since factor-price-insensitivity holds (dwS = dwU =0 ). In any
other situation, the level of individual skill and attitudes toward immigrants should be correlated,
in accordance with the relative skill composition of natives to immigrants, which determine how
38In particular, the changes of the skilled and unskilled wage given an inﬂow of immigrants dM > 0 are respectively

















where αi is the share of national income accruing to factor i and M =0at the beginning of the period. These
formulas correspond to Borjas’s (1999a) results in the case of a Cobb-Douglas production function.
39The hypothesis of small open economy implies
∂pi
∂M =0 , i =1 ,2 (since goods’ prices are set in international
markets).
40I assume that the individual level of skill and capital among natives is not aﬀected by immigration.
15factor prices are aﬀected. To summarize, more broadly, according to the factor-endowments mod-
els, individual attitudes on immigration policy are determined by each respondent’s factor type,
the receiving country’s relative factor supply and the relative factor endowment of the ﬂow of
immigrants.41
3.3 Additional empirical evidence on the correlation between individual skill
and immigration attitudes
My results in Section 3.1 show that individual skill is positively correlated with pro-immigration
preferences in high per capita GDP countries and, negatively, in low per capita GDP countries.
I next investigate which variable per capita GDP is proxying for, using the insights from the
theoretical models of Section 3.2.
Per capita GDP is thought to be a good proxy for a country’s human capital endowment.
However, according to the models in Section 3.2, the (ex-ante) skill composition of the destination
country’s labor force by itself does not pin down the sign of the relationship between individual
skill and preferences. Ceteris paribus, in countries with equal endowments of human capital, skilled
individuals may have diﬀerent attitudes toward immigrants, depending on the skill composition of
these foreign workers. In other words, it is the skill composition of natives relative to immigrants
which matters.
In a very simple one-sector model where countries share the same production function, economies
with higher ratios of skilled to unskilled labor (high per capita GDP countries) have lower rates
of return to skilled labor and higher rates of return to unskilled labor. The opposite is true for
countries with low values of the skill ratio (low per capita GDP countries). Labor ﬂows are driven
by diﬀerences in real rates of return to factors. Therefore, in this simple model, skilled labor tends
to move from high to low per capita GDP countries and, unskilled labor, in the opposite direction.
Based on such simplifying assumptions, it is possible to predict the skill composition of the inﬂow
of immigrants (and, therefore, also relative to natives), as a function of per capita income of the
destination country.
However, taking into account cross-country diﬀerences in technology levels complicates the
theoretical predictions. Given such a model, in richer countries rates of return can be higher than
in the rest of the world for all factors, making it diﬃcult to guess the skill composition of the
immigrant workforce.42
Hence, in order to explain my results in terms of the predictions of the factor-endowments
models, I need to test the following claim: per capita GDP in the regressions of Tables 2a and




hard to test this hypothesis directly, due to the scarcity of immigration data. For each receiving
country, I need information on immigrants and their skill level and, in comparable terms, the same
41Benhabib (1996)’s political economy paper of immigration policy preferences is similarly constructed.
42Davis and Weinstein (2002) stress the same point when they notice that all factors (unskilled labor, skilled labor
and capital) are characterized by positive net inﬂows into the United States.




(1−β)) is the ratio of skilled to unskilled labor
in the native relative to the immigrant populations. The theoretical predictions in (3) and (4) are in terms of the




(1−β) > 1 if and only if (b − β) > 0.
16statistics on natives. The OECD International Migration Statistics (IMS-OECD) data allows me to
construct the ratio b
(1−b)/
β
(1−β) for ﬁfteen countries, all developed economies.44 Indeed, for each of
these ﬁfteen countries, the IMS-OECD statistics give ﬁgures on native and immigrant populations
by ISCED level of education.45 However, only some of these countries are included in the ISSP-NI
data set (very few of them are present in the WVS data set).
Initial evidence in favor of my hypothesis is the simple correlation between per capita GDP and
the relative skill composition of natives to immigrants. Based on the ﬁfteen countries for which
data is available, this correlation is equal to 0.6120 (signiﬁcant at the 1.53% level).
The regressions in Table 3, based on a smaller number of countries than previous tables, also
oﬀer evidence consistent with the theoretical predictions in Section 3.2.46 The marginal eﬀects of
regressions (1) and (2) resemble the results from Tables 2a and 2b. The diﬀerence is that now
the country-speciﬁc impact of individual skill on immigration preferences is modeled directly as a
function of the relative skill composition of natives to immigrants. In other words, I have replaced
the product term education*gdp with the new interaction variable education*relative skill ratio.47
The results in columns (1) and (2) show that the relationship between the individual level of
skill and pro-immigration attitudes depends on the relative skill ratio. Educated individuals are
more likely to be pro-immigration if the latter variable is above a given threshold.48 This result
is consistent with the theoretical predictions since, the higher the relative skill composition of
natives to immigrants, the smaller the ex-post relative supply of skilled to unskilled labor in the
destination economy, and the higher (lower) the skilled (unskilled) wage. Notice that in regression
(3), which controls for both interaction terms education*gdp and education*relative skill ratio,o n l y
the marginal eﬀect on the latter variable is signiﬁcant. This result suggests that, in previous
regressions, per capita GDP was indeed capturing the eﬀect of the skill composition of natives
relative to immigrants.
The last two regressions test a more restrictive hypothesis. Based on the models of Section 3.2,
if the skill composition of immigrants exactly mirrors the human capital endowment of the native
population (β = b), there should be no eﬀect of immigration on factor returns and, therefore, on
44The ﬁfteen countries with data on skill composition of natives and immigrants are: West Germany, East Germany,
Great Britain, Austria, Italy, Ireland, Netherlands, Sweden, Canada, Spain, Portugal, France, Denmark, Belgium,
Finland.
45Due to unavailability of data on the skill composition of the ﬂow of immigrants, I use the same type of information
for the stock of immigrants. In other words, I adopt the same assumption as in Borjas (1999a)’s model: the skill
composition of immigrants is assumed not to change over time.
46The regressions of Table 3 are based on the following countries: Germany West, Germany East, Great Britain,






47In particular the relative skill ratio is the log of one plus the relative skill composition of natives to immigrants:




(1−β)). For both natives and immigrants, the ratio of skilled to unskilled labor is
measured as the ratio of the number of individuals with levels of education 2 and 3 to the number of individuals with
level 1 of education (see footnote 13). The data used to construct this variable is for the stock of immigrants and
natives in 1995 and comes from the IMS-OECD data (OECD 1997).
48The analysis in columns (1) and (2) assumes that individuals across countries think of an increase in the number
of immigrants in equal percentage terms, relative to their country’s population (
dM
N ). If I instead consider the
actual number of immigrants relative to the population in 1995 (immigrant) and I construct the interaction variable
education*relative skill ratio*immigrant,t h ec o e ﬃcient on the latter variable and the direct eﬀect of education are
both positive and signiﬁcant.
17preferences. If instead natives are more (less) skilled than immigrants, the relative supply of skill will
be lower (higher) ex-post and real rates of return to skilled labor will be higher (lower). In column
(4), SN (skilled natives) is an indicator variable for whether the ratio of skilled to unskilled labor
for natives is greater than for immigrants; SM (skilled immigrants) is an indicator for the opposite
situation.49 In other words, these two variables are constructed using the cut-oﬀ point equal to
one for the relative skill composition b
(1−b)/
β
(1−β). In the estimates of column (4), as expected in
the theoretical models, the marginal eﬀects of the two interaction variables which include SN and
SM are respectively positive and negative.50 If natives are more skilled than immigrants (SN=1),
the impact of years of education is positive and bigger in magnitude the more diﬀerent the two
groups are in terms of skill composition. If immigrants are more skilled than natives (SM=1), then
(setting aside the direct eﬀect of individual skill) more educated individuals are less likely to be
pro-immigration, with the latter eﬀect becoming stronger as the disparity in skill ratios widens.
Finally, the marginal eﬀect of years of education by itself, positive and signiﬁcant at the 1% level,
contradicts one of the predictions of the factor-endowments models. There should be no eﬀect of
immigration on wages and, therefore, on preferences if the skill compositions of immigrants and
natives are the same. It is possible that the result depends on the eﬀect of education working
through non-economic channels, as discussed above.
To summarize, for the sample of OECD countries on which Table 3 is based, I ﬁnd the results
quite supportive of my hypothesis. My estimates suggest that per capita GDP in previous re-
gressions was proxying for the relative skill composition of natives to immigrants. The correlation
between immigration preferences and individual skill is consistent with the change, due to immi-
gration, in the host country’s supply of skilled to unskilled labor. More generally, this evidence
supports an explanation of the cross-country pattern along the lines of the factor-endowments mod-
els. The results for this group of developed countries are consistent with both the predictions of the
HO model without factor-price-insensitivity and of the FPA model. They are not in line, however,
with an HO model in which changes in factor endowments do not trigger changes in factor prices
and where only Rybczynski eﬀects occur.
For all the other countries not analyzed in Table 3, mostly middle and low-income economies,
the interpretation of the skill-attitudes pattern depends on whether there is any immigration at all
to such countries and, if so, which type of immigration in terms of skill composition. It is plausible
to extend the interpretation based on Table 3 to countries with sizeable immigration intakes. On the
other hand, in countries characterized by small immigration numbers, the factor-price-insensitivity
result may hold.51
49The countries with SN equal to 1 are: Germany West, Germany East, Great Britain, Austria, Netherlands,
Sweden, Canada, France (not included in the regression), Denmark (not included in the regression), Belgium (not
included in the regression), Finland (not included in the regression). The countries with SM=1 are: Italy, Ireland,
Spain, Portugal (not included in the regression).
50The two interaction variables are, respectively, education*SN*(RSC-1) and education*SM*(1-RSC),w h e r eRSC
is the relative skill composition.
51In other words, some countries may have such small immigration inﬂows that, given that the economy is diversiﬁed,
factor prices are not aﬀected and no signiﬁcant diﬀerence emerges in preferences, according to individual skill. This
interpretation of the results may apply for those countries whose marginal eﬀect of skill is estimated to be not
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. Unfortunately, these are also the countries for which reliable data on immigration
ﬂows is not available.
18If there is indeed immigration to middle and low-income countries, the next step is to investigate




(1−β) would take on lower values for poorer destination countries than for richer ones,
since its correlation with per capita GDP is positive and signiﬁcant (based on ﬁfteen countries).
Only if this is true, is the negative correlation between pro-immigration preferences and individual
skill in lower-income countries consistent with the predictions of the factor-endowments models.
Unfortunately, the empirical evidence on size and skill composition of immigration to developing
countries is now very scarce. Very few sources in the literature document the extent of immigration
to these destinations.52 One of them, the International Labor Migration Database (ILO 1998),
shows that immigrants’ ﬂows to lower-income destinations exist and are sometimes substantial
in magnitude (however, this data cannot be used, due to the low degree of harmonization across
countries). As for the skill composition of immigration to developing countries, preliminary evidence
suggests that it might be consistent with the results of this paper.53 Future empirical work on this
point should focus on the worldwide increase in short-term mobility of highly-skilled workers, due
to the reduction in international business travel and communication costs54, and on medium and
long-term ﬂows of skilled labor linked to FDI into low per capita GDP countries.
3.4 Individual-level Data on Occupation
In the last four columns of Table 3 (regressions (6)-(9)), I use individual-level data on occupation
to further test the robustness of the factor-endowments explanation.55 Speciﬁcally, I match each
individual with the number of immigrants relative to natives in his occupation. I interpret each
occupation as a diﬀerent factor of production and assume that segmented labor markets exist for
each of them. I can then use the predictions of the multi-factor version (m> >n )o ft h ef a c t o r -
endowments models. If an occupation has a higher ratio of immigrants to natives, it means that,
due to immigration, it has experienced a bigger increase in supply relative to other occupations.
Therefore, according to a factor-endowment story, individuals in such occupations will be less likely
52These sources include: Jenks (1992) (on the other settler societies, especially Argentina), SOPEMI (1997) on
Central and Eastern European countries, such as Bulgaria, the Czech and Slovak Republics, Hungary, Poland and the
former Soviet Union, which have become in the nineties a new destination of immigration ﬂows; and OECD (2000)
on certain Asian countries. Some of these references and additional ones are documented in Freeman (1995).
53For example, SOPEMI (1997) documents the following: “Several developing South-East Asian countries have
emerged as both sending and receiving countries for skilled and unskilled workers....China, which is experiencing
shortages of highly skilled labour and which is now receiving important inﬂows of foreign direct investment, counted
roughly 80,000 foreign workers in 1995, one third of whom were from Japan, 20 per cent from the United States and
13 per cent from Germany.” (p.48). Also remember that what matters in the model is the relative skill composition
of natives to immigrants, where the average level of skill of natives in developing countries is generally low.
54The implications of these changes are analyzed in Tang and Wood (2000). In their model, highly-skilled individuals
from developed countries can work either in the North or in the South, thus aﬀecting the income distribution in the
two parts of the world. Even though this type of short-term mobility does not imply a change in residence of highly-
skilled workers from the North to the South, it may still be perceived as labor-market competition by skilled labor
in the South.
55These regressions are based on six countries: Germany West, Germany East, Great Britain, Austria, Ireland
and Spain. These are the countries for which data on both individual occupation and on the ratio of immigrants to
natives by occupation is available.
19to be pro-immigration. In this framework, skilled (unskilled) labor is considered as many diﬀerent
factors as the number of occupations in which it is employed.
In regression (6), I look at the relationship between immigration preferences and the immigrants-
to-natives ratio of the individual’s occupation (IN ratio), including among the regressors the usual
socio-economic controls (age, male, parents’ foreign citizenship, education).56 I ﬁnd that, in oc-
cupations characterized by higher fractions of foreigners relative to natives, individuals are more
likely to be anti-immigration. The marginal eﬀect of the IN ratio is negative and signiﬁcant at the
1% level.57 This result is not inconsistent with the models of Section 3.2 given that, at least in the
short-run, the multi-factor version of the factor-endowments models is likely to hold, due to the
segmentation of labor markets within the economy. In the short run, it is plausible that immigrants
only aﬀect the real rates of return of the occupations they take up and, therefore, the preferences
of individuals working in the same activity.
In column (7), I add two additional controls, Immig Crime and Immig Culture.T h em a r g i n a l
eﬀect of the IN ratio is now smaller in absolute value but still signiﬁcant at the 1% level. The
decrease (in absolute value) of the eﬀect of the IN ratio suggests that this variable is in part
picking up the impact of non-economic factors, such as security and cultural issues. However the
latter ones are likely to be inﬂuenced by the pressure that a worker faces in terms of labor-market
competition.
The result in regression (6) is driven by a short-run view of the labor market, in which individuals
are on average immobile across occupations. One way to investigate this ﬁnding is to account for
the degree of individual mobility. Column (8) includes in the model a new regressor, which is meant
to proxy for the individual willingness to move across occupations.58 The estimates in regression
( 8 )a r en o ta l ls i g n i ﬁcant but they suggest that mobility is an important determinant. The extent
to which individuals in occupations with a higher IN ratio are more likely to be anti-immigration
depends on their individual degree of mobility. The more mobile an individual is, the weaker the
impact of the IN ratio on his anti-immigration attitude.59
Finally, in regression (9), I investigate which version of the factor-endowments models is con-
sistent with stated opinions about immigration. The multi-factor version, based on occupations,
provides a short-run view of the labor market, where we assume individuals on average are not able
to move from one occupation to the other. On the other hand, the 3×2 factor-endowments models
in Section 3.2 are based on a long-run view of the economy, in the sense that skilled and unskilled
56The IN ratio in Table 3 is equal to the log of one plus the ratio in 1995 of the number of foreigners to the number
of natives in the individual’s occupation (the data for immigrants and natives is for to the stock of immigrants and
natives in 1995). Data on immigrants’ and natives’ occupations follows the 1988 ISCO classiﬁcation (see Section 2).
57The IN ratio in regressions (6)-(9) is equal to (the log of one plus)
αM
aN ,w h e r eα and a are the fractions of,
respectively, immigrants and natives in a given occupation. Since country ﬁxed eﬀects are included in the regressions,
the coeﬃcient on the IN ratio captures the impact of the ratio of immigrants to natives in a given occupation relative
to the country’s immigrants-to-natives ratio, in line with the theory (see Section 3.2). In other words, what matters
is whether the ratio of immigrants to natives in a given occupation is higher than for the whole economy.
58The variable willingness to move measures the individual’s stated willingness to move to another city/town, in
order to improve work or living conditions (1=very unwilling, 5=very willing). Although it is an imperfect measure
of the degree of individual mobility across occupations, it is likely to be a good proxy of this measure.
59Even though what matters for the segmentation of labor markets is the average willingness to move across
occupations, still an individual who is more willing than average to switch to another occupation is less vulnerable
to the adverse impact of immigration.
20labor are supposed to be free to move across occupations and equalize real rates of return. By com-
paring the two models, I investigate which time horizon individuals have in mind when they assess
immigration policy, that is, whether they are thinking in terms of the short-run or the long-run
impact of immigration or both. The results of column (9) suggest that the relevant time horizon
used by individuals to assess the impact of immigration is a long-run one, in which the perceived
eﬀect of labor inﬂows is on national labor markets of skilled and unskilled labor. The marginal
eﬀect of the IN ratio is negative but not signiﬁcant, while the correlation between individual skill
and attitudes is signiﬁcant and displays the usual pattern.
4 Non-Economic Determinants of Individual Attitudes
Up to now, the analysis has focused on economic determinants of immigration policy attitudes. I
next investigate correlation patterns between attitudes toward immigrants and individual answers
to questions about non-economic issues. The inclusion in the empirical model of these regressors
allows me to test the robustness of the ﬁndings described in the ﬁrst part of the paper. In some
speciﬁcations, I already tested the strength of the results by controlling for Immig Crime and
Immig Culture (the impact of immigration on, respectively, crime rates and cultural openness, as
perceived by each individual).60 The regressions including the latter two variables show the strong
correlation between these non-economic issues and immigration preferences. In particular, in Table
2a, column (5) shows that if an individual either disagrees or disagrees strongly with the claim that
immigrants raise crime rates, the probability that he is in favor of an increase in their number goes
up by about 4.7 percentage points. Similarly, a respondent who either agrees or agrees strongly
with the statement that immigrants make the country more open to new ideas and cultures will be
around 5.1 percentage points more likely to support a raise in immigration.
Both security worries and cultural and national-identity issues are key non-economic factors
aﬀecting immigration opinions. Security concerns are related to the perception that immigrants
are more likely than natives to be involved in criminal activity. An interesting question is whether
this belief is linked to an objective situation — due for example to a negative selection of immigrants
to some countries, driven by the type of immigration policy — or whether it is driven by racist and
intolerant feelings, although I cannot distinguish these causes in the data.
Cultural and national-identity issues are related to the intrinsic side eﬀect of immigration:
the meeting, which often becomes a clash, of people of diﬀerent ethnic origins and cultures.61
The integration of immigrants in the destination society may be perceived as a source of cultural
e n r i c h m e n to nb o t hs i d e s ,w h i c hi sw h a ti sc a p t u r e db yh i g hv a l u e so ft h ev a r i a b l eImmig Culture.
On the other hand, immigration may feed cultural and national-identity worries, driven by the
belief that the set of values and traditions that characterize the receiving country’s society are
threatened by the arrival of foreigners. At the extreme, these types of concerns may just be the
consequence of the dislike of anything which is diﬀerent, that is, cultural and racial intolerance.
Cultural and national-identity issues due to migration are likely to be a key input in individual
60These two variables are available in the ISSP-NI data set only.
61“In Adam’s Smith’s words ‘man is of all sorts of luggage the most diﬃcult to be transported.’” (Chiswick and
Hatton 2002, p.1)
21preferences (see Akerlof and Kranton (2000) on the role of identity in economics). A few survey
questions in the ISSP-NI data set, combined with external data on countries of origin of immigrants,
allow me to investigate the role of this set of issues. Two main factors inﬂuence immigration pref-
erences through the national and cultural-identity channel: ﬁrst, the individual attitude toward a
culturally homogenous society, which I call monoculturalism, as opposed to a multicultural commu-
nity, labeled multiculturalism; and, next, whether immigrants adapt successfully in the destination
country’s society or not. The latter is a function of how much immigrants and natives are culturally
diﬀerent. I use information on the ﬁve main countries of origin of foreigners for each host country
to construct measures of cultural dissimilarity between natives and immigrants.
Table 4a, based on the ISSP-NI data set, shows the results focusing on the non-economic
determinants of immigration preferences. As expected, I ﬁnd that individuals with a taste for
m u l t i c u l t u r a l i s ma r em o r el i k e l yt ob ep r o - i m m i g r a t i o n ,w h i l et h eo p p o s i t ei st r u ef o rr e s p o n d e n t s
with a preference for a more homogeneous society, in terms of customs and traditions (column (1)
in Table 4a). I next investigate how these two variables — monoculturalism and multiculturalism
— interact with the degree of cultural diﬀerence between natives and immigrants. I look at diﬀer-
ences based on the main language spoken and on religious aﬃliation in the origin and destination
countries and I explore the role of past colonial relationships. The only signiﬁcant results of this
analysis relate to dissimilarities in religious aﬃliation and are presented in regression (2), which
contains the interaction terms between religious diﬀerence and, respectively, monoculturalism and
multiculturalism.62 I ﬁnd that, while the marginal eﬀect of monoculturalism does not change with
religious diﬀerence, individuals with a taste for multiculturalism are negatively aﬀected in their
immigration opinion by bigger dissimilarities between natives and immigrants in religious terms.63
The variables in column (3) also give information on cultural and national-identity issues.64 In
particular, national pride (2) and national pride (3), which are negatively and signiﬁcantly related
to pro-immigration attitudes, quantify the extent of individual attachment to the nation, the latter
indicator in a stronger form than the former one.65 The results from regression (3) are consistent
with the basic intuition that individuals who feel closer to their country’s identity are more likely
to be anti-immigration.66 Column (4) in Table 1b, based on the WVS data set, reveals the same
pattern: More patriotic and nationalistic individuals are less likely to be in favor of immigration.
I next look at the relationship between immigration preferences and individual feelings about
illegal immigration and political refugees (regression (4), Table 4a). Both variables have the ex-
pected sign and are highly signiﬁcant. Individuals who are against illegal immigration and who do
62The variable religious diﬀerence, which measures the dissimilarity between natives and immigrants in terms of










¯ ¯,w h e r eD and
O are for destination and origin country and pr represents the fraction of the population in religion r.
63Regression (2) is based on the following countries: Germany West, Germany East, Great Britain, United States,
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Canada, Japan.
64These variables are: town, county, continent, national pride (1), (2), (3), and (4).
65The four variables national pride (1)-(4) measure the emphasis with which an individual declares respectively:
(1) “feeling close to own country”; (2) “rather be citizen of own country”; (3) “own country better than others”;
(4) “in favor of country’s interests at any cost”. See Data Appendix 4 for summary statistics of these variables and
Mayda and Rodrik (2003) for details about their construction.
66This conﬁrms one of the main results in Espenshade and Hempstead (1996), which concerns the link between
immigration preferences and isolationist feelings (p.543).
22not welcome political refugees are also more likely to oppose an increase in immigration. On the
other hand, column (5) suggests that whether an individual belongs to the dominant ethnic group
in society does not have a signiﬁcant impact on opinions about foreigners.
Finally, in the last column of Table 4a, I put together all the main factors shaping immigration
attitudes into a single speciﬁcation. By combining both sets of variables, economic and non-
economic ones, I can investigate how robust my previous ﬁndings are. The picture of individual
preferences that emerges from this ﬁnal set of results is multi-faceted. Both economic and non-
economic indicators appear to be important. But, in particular, regression (6) shows that the
cross-country pattern in the correlation between preferences and skill — negative relationship for
lower-income countries, positive one for higher-income destinations — is still present when I control
for non-economic determinants of attitudes. This result remains robust when I use the WVS data
set.
As mentioned before, intolerance on the basis of race may explain a lot of the variation in
immigration preferences and may be the driving force behind other types of explanations. The
WVS data set includes a question that allows me to construct a measure of racist feelings.67 The
regressions in Table 4b, in which I focus on this measure of individual racist feelings, highlight
two important points. First, racism is highly correlated with anti-immigration feelings, as shown
in column (1). A respondent who would rather not have as neighbors individuals of a diﬀerent
race is more than eight percentage points less likely to be in favor of an increase in immigration.
In addition, the cross-country pattern in the correlation between skill and preferences is almost
unaﬀected by the inclusion of the racism variable (columns (2) and (3)). Labor-market based
explanations survive this robustness test.68
To conclude the analysis on immigration attitudes, I investigate how well I am explaining
the variation in immigration preferences across individuals. Based on my preferred speciﬁcations
(column (6) in Table 4a for the ISSP-NI data set and column (2) in Table 4b for the WVS data
set), I can calculate the percentage of answers correctly predicted by the model.69 In the ISSP-NI
data set, out of the total sample of individuals for whom I have both actual and ﬁtted immigration
preferences, I can correctly predict approximately 70% of the answers (the variable predicted can
take up three values).70 In the WVS sample, the percentage of answers correctly predicted by the
model is around 48% (the variable predicted can take up four values).71 Thus, for both data sets,
the estimated models fare better than a random assignment of answers to individuals.72
67The ISSP-NI data set does not include any question that allows me to construct a measure of racist feelings.
68I get the same result if I add the interaction of the racism variable with per capita GDP.
69I estimate my preferred speciﬁcations using an ordered probit model with the three-valued Immig Opinion (1=“re-
d u c e dal o t ”o r“ r e d u c e dal i t t l e ” ,2 = “ r e m a i nt h es a m ea si t is”, 3=“increased a little” or “increased a lot”) as the
dependent variable for the ISSP-NI data set (Immig Opinion (WVS) for the WVS data set). I assign to each individual
the answer whose predicted probability is the highest among all possible answers.
70In particular, I can correctly predict around 91% of the answers of those individuals who would like the number
of immigrants to decrease (either a little or a lot) and whose opinion can be predicted with the model. The same
percentages for individuals who would like the number of immigrants to stay the same or to increase (either a little
or a lot) are respectively 37% and 12%.
71In particular, I can correctly predict around 37% of the answers of those individuals who would like immigration
to be prohibited or strictly limited and whose opinion can be predicted with the model. The same percentage for
individuals who would like immigrants to come, given availability of jobs or without any conditions, is around 80%.
72Moreover, considering that in the ISSP-NI sample the percentage of individuals answering in favor of a reduction
23This measure of goodness of ﬁt — the percentage of answers correctly predicted — is one of the
most common after estimation of probit models. It is also informative to run OLS regressions for
the preferred speciﬁcations and look at the corresponding R2 measures. The percentage of the total
variance explained by the preferred speciﬁcations (including the dummy variables) is approximately
26% for the ISSP-NI sample of countries and much lower, 10%, using the WVS data set.
5 Trade and Immigration Policy Attitudes: A Comparison
International economic integration can take place through both trade in goods and services and
through factor movements, for example immigration. A comparative analysis of individual prefer-
ences on trade versus immigration policy can shed light on whether the variation in policy outcomes
in these two dimensions originates from diﬀerences in peoples’ attitudes.
Trade and immigration aﬀect the destination country’s labor markets in a parallel way. Both
trade and immigration allow countries to exchange services of factors of production — indirectly and
directly, respectively — thus changing labor market conditions and possibly altering the structure
of factor returns. To the extent that changes in labor markets due to trade and immigration are
qualitatively similar, individual preferences on trade and immigration should be correlated.73
Both trade and immigration aﬀect the receiving country’s society but to diﬀering degrees.
While it is true that trade creates social tensions through the pressure it exerts toward “arbitrage
in national norms and social institutions” (Rodrik 1997, p.29), still the societal and cultural eﬀects
of immigration can be expected to be much more direct.
In light of these considerations, it is interesting to investigate how preferences toward trade
and immigration are related to each other. Based on the two ordinal measures of attitudes Immig
Opinion and Trade Opinion in Data Appendix 1a and 1b (ISSP-NI data set), the country-speciﬁc
percentages of respondents in favor of trade are much higher than for immigration. The two
variables are also positively and signiﬁcantly correlated in twenty of the 23 countries considered, as
shown in Data Appendix 5. This evidence is consistent with the intuition that a few common factors
aﬀect both types of preferences, while some of the forces at work in anti-immigration attitudes are
absent or softened in the case of trade.
I next compare economic determinants of trade and immigration attitudes. One of the strongest
r e s u l t so ft h i sp a p e ri st h es k i l l sc l e a v a g ei np r e ference formation over immigration policy. This
ﬁnding is reminiscent of a parallel one in O’Rourke and Sinnott (2001) and in Mayda and Rodrik
(2003) (see columns (1) and (6) in Table 5). These two papers show that attitudes toward free trade
are signiﬁcantly and robustly correlated with individuals’ human capital levels, in accordance with
the predictions of the Heckscher-Ohlin model. Skilled individuals are more likely than unskilled
ones to be in favor of trade liberalization in skill-abundant countries, and less likely in skill-scarce
countries. This result is consistent with the theoretical prediction that owners of a country’s
abundant factors gain from trade liberalization (Stolper-Samuelson theorem). The parallelism
in immigration is approximately 64% and this type of answer is the most popular one, the model I estimated is a
better predictor of answers than matching every individual with the most popular answer (the percentage for the
most popular answer is, in the WVS data set, 44%).
73Other aspects of the destination country’s economy, other than the labor market, are aﬀected by trade and
immigration in a dissimilar way (for example, the ﬁscal impact on the welfare state).
24between the two sets of results — on immigration and trade preferences, respectively — suggests that
the changes in relative supplies of factors brought about by trade and immigration are qualitatively
similar.
In Mayda and Rodrik (2002) the sector-speciﬁc model is tested. Regressions (2)-(5) in Ta-
ble 5 compare immigration policy preferences to attitudes toward trade policy, using the sector
classiﬁcation adopted in Mayda and Rodrik (2002).74
Replicating the results from Mayda and Rodrik (2002) on trade preferences, column (5) shows
that respondents who work in comparatively-disadvantaged (CD) sectors are signiﬁcantly less likely
to be pro-trade, compared to individuals in non-traded sectors. Pro-immigration preferences also
are signiﬁcantly and negatively aﬀected by whether the respondent works in a CD sector (column
(2)). This result is consistent with the evidence, documented in the literature (Faini and Venturini
1994 and Coppel et al. 2001), that import-competing sectors rely heavily on migrant labor. The
result is also plausible from a theoretical point of view: In a Ricardian framework, immigration
expands the range of goods produced by the destination country, which absorbs immigrants in
sectors with low productivity that would disappear without immigration (Treﬂer 1997).
While the type of good produced in a sector, whether traded or not, is one of the main cleavages
in preference formation over trade policy (column (4), Table 5), the same pattern does not char-
acterize immigration policy attitudes (column (3), Table 5). As is intuitive, workers in non-traded
sectors feel shielded from foreign competition working through trade but not from labor-market
competition of immigrants.75
6 Main results and conclusions
The empirical literature on immigration preferences reaches diﬀerent conclusions on the role of
economic versus non-economic factors. For the United States, while Espenshade and Hempstead
(1996) ﬁnd mostly evidence in favor of non-economic explanations behind preference patterns, the
results in Scheve and Slaughter (2001a) and in Kessler (2001) draw attention to the importance of
economic determinants. The results in Citrin et al. (1997) are presented, instead, as weak evidence
for the role of personal economic circumstances in U.S. immigration preferences. Finally, the
analysis in Dustmann and Preston (2001b) points out that in Great Britain economic determinants
matter for attitudes toward immigrants, but that racial prejudice is deﬁnitely the most important
factor in preference formation.
I ﬁnd evidence that both sets of factors, economic and non-economic ones, are important.
In a wide range of countries, attitudes toward immigrants appear to be related to labor-market
concerns, security and cultural considerations, as well as individual feelings toward political refugees
and illegal immigration. In particular, my analysis shows that the economic variables continue to
play a key and robust role in preference formation over immigration policy, after controlling for
74See Mayda and Rodrik (2003), in particular Appendix A, for a description of the sector classiﬁcation.
75From a theoretical point of view, a few assumptions are needed for individuals in non-traded sectors to beneﬁt
with a trade liberalization. Prices of non-traded goods are not directly aﬀected by a trade liberalization. However,
indirectly, if the income elasticity of demand for non-traded goods is positive, prices of non-traded goods will increase
with a trade liberalization, since national income will go up (Scheve and Slaughter 2001c). What matters for the net
eﬀect on non-traded sectors is the overall change in relative prices.
25non-economic factors. My results, therefore, reject a view of the world in which only non-economic
issues shape attitudes toward foreigners.
The evidence presented in the current paper shows that opinions about immigration policy
are signiﬁcantly correlated with individual skill and that there exists a great deal of cross-country
variation in terms of this correlation. Individual skill appears to be positively correlated with
pro-immigration preferences in high per capita GDP countries and negatively correlated with pro-
immigration preferences in low per capita GDP countries. This result is robust to various changes
in the empirical speciﬁcation and to the use of two diﬀerent data sources.
Additional ﬁndings, based on a smaller sample of countries, suggest that the correlation between
preferences and individual skill depends on the immigration-induced changes in the relative supply
of skilled to unskilled labor in the destination economy. This result is consistent with the predictions
of the Heckscher-Ohlin model, without factor-price-insensitivity, and of the factor-proportions-
analysis model. Individual-level data on occupatio np r o v i d em o r ee v i d e n c ei nf a v o ro ft h ef a c t o r -
endowment explanation. Individuals in occupations with a higher ratio of immigrants to natives
appear to be more likely to oppose immigration.
Non-economic variables also are found to be signiﬁcantly correlated with immigration policy
preferences. Both concerns regarding the impact of immigration on crime rates and individual
perceptions of the cultural eﬀect of foreigners are found to covary with immigration attitudes. In
addition, racist feelings have a very strong, negative and signiﬁcant impact on pro-immigration
preferences. However, these non-economic determinants do not seem to alter signiﬁcantly the
results regarding the economic variables. Labor-market explanations of attitudes toward foreigners
survive, after taking into account these non-economic factors.
Based on the speciﬁcation of the model which includes both economic and non-economic ex-
planations, I can look into what accounts for diﬀerences in average attitudes across countries.76
Let’s consider, for example, Canada and Hungary which, in terms of attitudes toward foreigners,
are at the opposite extremes (see Data Appendix 1a), with the former country much more open to
immigration than the latter one. According to my model, some 34 percent of the diﬀerence between
Canadians and Hungarians in terms of pro-immigration preferences is explained by the diﬀerence
in the impact of individual skill (i.e., the combination of the diﬀerence in both average individual
skill in each country and the country-speciﬁc marginal eﬀect of skill), around 6 percent by the
diﬀerence in the percentages of individuals having parents with foreign citizenship, 10 percent by
stronger feelings against illegal immigrants in Hungary relative to Canada and, ﬁnally, more than
7 percent by less sympathetic feelings toward political refugees in Hungary than in Canada.77
Finally, the last part of the empirical analysis focused on the relationship between individual
attitudes toward open trade and opinions about immigration. While preferences on immigration
and trade are positively correlated, individuals appear to be, on average, more pro-trade than pro-
immigration. My empirical results point out that both sets of opinions are aﬀected by the changes
in relative factor endowments which occur through goods trade and labor ﬂows. In addition,
one important ﬁnding is that a key source of the diﬀerence in attitudes is the cleavage in trade
76This decomposition of the diﬀerence in average immigration attitudes across countries is based on OLS coeﬃcient
estimates of a regression model with the three-valued Immig Opinion as the dependent variable and with the same
regressors as in column (6), Table 4a.
77The rest of the diﬀerence is mostly explained by diﬀerences in the two country dummy variables.
26preferences, absent in immigration attitudes, between individuals working in traded sectors and
individuals working in non-traded sectors. The latter result provides an answer to one of the puzzles
pointed out in the recent immigration literature, speciﬁc a l l yt h ea s y m m e t r yi np o l i c ya t t i t u d e s
toward trade and immigration.78
Immigration has become a central theme of political discussions in many countries and it is
likely to increasingly draw policymakers’ attention, along with trade issues, in the debate about
international integration. Indeed goods’ trade and labor ﬂows are closely related, with their impact
on the economy positively aﬀecting some groups and negatively others. This paper has shed light on
the distributional and cultural impact of immigration, as perceived by individuals, and it has related
it to the eﬀect of trade on diﬀerent groups in society. Since individual attitudes are necessarily a
key input in policy outcomes and their viability, this work contributes to a better understanding
of immigration-policy decisions and, in relation to it, trade-policy ones.
AA p p e n d i x
A . 1 T h ei m p a c to fi m m i g r a t i o no nf a c t o rp r i c e si nt h em × n Heckscher-Ohlin
model
Consider a small open economy, characterized by constant returns to scale and perfect competition
in each sector. The predictions of the HO model, with regard to the impact of immigration on
factor rates of return, depend on a key condition that relates the number of internationally-traded
goods produced in the country to the number of primary factors of production. To gain intuition
regarding this condition, it is useful to think in terms of the system of equations of production
equilibrium in each sector — price is equal to unit cost — and the set of factors’ market-clearing
conditions:79




yibik(·), k =1 ,...,m (7)
where pi and yi,i=1 ,...,nare respectively prices and quantities produced of each good, Vk and
wk, ,k =1 ,...,m are respectively primary factor supplies and prices and, ﬁnally, bi(·),i=1 ,...,n
are sectors’ unit cost functions, characterized by partial derivatives (with respect to each factor
78Faini (2001) emphasizes that the diﬀerence between non-traded and traded sectors - in individual attitudes
towards trade and immigration - is likely to be an important factor explaining why preferences are asymmetric in the
two domains. I ﬁnd empirical evidence consistent with this hypothesis.
79In a competitive equilibrium, the price of each good must be equal to its marginal cost, which equals the unit
cost under constant returns to scale. Notice also that, given constant returns to scale, the unit cost function in each
sector does not depend on the quantity produced of that good.
27price) bik(·).80 Notice that the partial derivatives bik(·) give the optimum requirement of input k
necessary to produce one unit of good i.
The system of equations (6) has as many equations as there are sectors (n)a n da sm a n y
unknowns (factor prices) as the number of primary factors of production (m).
If n ≥ m, ceteris paribus as u ﬃciently small increase of a factor’s supply (dVk > 0 for any k)
does not have any eﬀect on factor rates of return. That is dwk =0 ,f o re v e r yk =1 ,...,m,w h i c h
means that factor-price-insensitivity (FPI) holds: factor prices are insensitive to changes in factor
supplies.81 The reason for this result is that, with no improvement in technology, changes in factor
prices can only be caused by changes in goods’ prices, as system (6) shows.82 In addition, since
the shock to the factor supply is suﬃciently small, the economy keeps producing the same range of
products, that is the cone of diversiﬁcation of the country does not change. The factor-supply shock
only aﬀects the quantity produced of each good, according to the predictions of the Rybczynski
theorem.83
If the same condition on the relative number of goods and factors holds (n ≥ m) but the increase
in the factor’s supply is substantial, the country’s cone of diversiﬁcation changes. Hence, it ends
up producing a diﬀerent set of goods. In this case, factor-price-insensitivity does not hold: changes
in factor endowments have an impact on factor rates of return.84
Finally, if n<mchanges in factor endowments always change factor prices since the latter ones
are not fully determined by goods’ prices.
A.2 “Can’t Choose” and “Don’t Know” Answers and the Incidental Parameter
Problem
One important issue in the estimation is how to deal with the Can’t Choose (CC) and Don’t Know
(DK) responses to the immigration question, respectively in the ISSP-NI and WVS data sets. The
percentages of CC and DK responses in the two data sets are quite high and vary greatly across
countries. If the observations corresponding to these values are excluded from the samples, a lot of
information is lost. Moreover — and this represents a more serious concern — omitting the CC and
DK observations could result in inconsistent estimates, due to a selection bias.
The Heckman selection model is the framework I exploit to test whether deletion of CC and
DK observations causes a selection bias. I use the Stata command “heckprob” which combines two
probit models, one for the main model and one for the selection model. By using this command, I
80In (6) if trade is perfectly free, goods’ prices are equal to international prices, otherwise there is a wedge between
the domestic and the international price, equal to the tariﬀ (or tariﬀ-equivalent). In any case goods’ prices are given,
in the sense that they do not depend on the country’s supply and demand.
81The label factor-price-insensitivity comes from Leamer and Levinsohn (1995). Notice that the conditions needed
for FPE (factor-price equalization) are stronger.
82If n ≥ m, the number of unknowns in system (6) is lower than the number of equations. If in particular
n = m and the equations are independent, the system is exactly determined. If instead n>m ,t h es y s t e mm a yb e
overdetermined.
83The predictions of the the Rybczynski theorem properly refer to the 2×2 case. A generalization of the Rybczynski
result applies to the case n = m.
84The intuition about this result is that the equations of system (6) have now changed (some of them correspond
to diﬀerent goods).
28give up some of the information in the ordered answers that I could have used in the second stage,
as I will explain below. My model looks as follows:
Main model (a):
y∗
j = xjβ + u1j (latent equation)
yj =1 if y∗
j ≥ 0; 0 otherwise (probit equation)
Selection model (b):
yselect
j =1 if zjγ + u2j ≥ 0 (selection equation)
where:
zj and yselect
j are observed for ∀j; yj is observed only if yselect
j =1 ; X ⊆ Z
(u1,u 2) is independent of Z with u1 ∼ N(0,1),u 2 ∼ N(0,1),E [u1/u2]=ρu2
y∗
j can be interpreted as the change in the indirect utility of the individual, due to a change in
the number of immigrants. However, we cannot observe this value, we can only observe whether it
is greater or equal to zero (i.e., the individual would like the number of immigrants to his country
to increase) or negative. What the selection model captures is the fact that, for some individuals,
the utility of not choosing a speciﬁc answer is greater than the utility of choosing it. One possible
explanation of this behavior is a particular cultural attitude toward questioning: in some cultures,
some members of society are less likely to express an opinion (for example, women). Another
explanation is uncertainty of the right answer, due to lack of knowledge on the topic. Given
these explanations for the selection mechanism, it is likely that factors causing whether or not an
individual gives an opinion also have an impact on immigration preferences. Hence, to the extent
that I am not able to control for these common determinants, the error terms u1 and u2 could be
correlated. That is why it is necessary to test for selection bias.
An alternative to using heckprob would have been to run the two steps of the Heckman procedure
separately: in the ﬁrst stage, a probit equation (selection model) for whether an individual answers
the question or not; in the second stage, after excluding the CC and DK observations, an (ordered)
probit model (main model), controlling for the estimated inverse Mills ratio.85
In the selection model (b), I use all the same regressors as in the main model plus an additional
variable, which makes identiﬁcation possible. For the ISSP-NI data set, I use the information on
whether or not the individual has expressed an opinion to the parallel question on trade policy. I
check that this variable does not have a signiﬁcant impact on the dependent variable in the main
model (a). For the WVS data set, I use the information on whether or not the individual has given
an answer to various questions on environmental policy.86
85I decided not to follow this strategy and opted for heckprob. The reason is that, as Wooldridge (2002, p.564)
explains, the standard errors of the coeﬃcient estimates in the second stage are not consistently estimated with this
procedure (due to heteroskedasticity and the 2-stages nature of the estimation). In the standard case with a linear
regression in the main model, under the null of no selection bias, a standard t test is a valid test of selection bias
(i.e., standard errors are consistently estimated). But, giv e na no r d e r e dp r o b i ti nt h em a i ne q u a t i o n ,r e s u l t sa r en o t
as straightforward.
86The questions on environmental policy I consider are the following:
29I run heckprob regressions for each single speciﬁcation of my paper, using both the ISSP-NI and
the WVS data sets. For all the speciﬁcations of my paper, I cannot reject the null hypothesis of
no selection bias.87 Since I ﬁnd no evidence of selection bias, in the empirical analysis of the paper
I can disregard the observations corresponding to CC and DK responses. I then run probit and
ordered probit regressions using all the other observations. This regression will give me consistent
estimates of the coeﬃcients and marginal eﬀects.
A second issue to consider when using ﬁxed eﬀects with an ordered probit model is the inci-
dental parameter problem. Given a model estimated using a panel data set (T observations for
each unit i =1 ,...,N), the parameters speciﬁc for each unit i are called “incidental” parameters.
These parameters are usually estimated introducing dummy variables, that is using a ﬁxed-eﬀect
speciﬁcation, as in this paper. In a probit model, the maximum-likelihood estimator of the inci-
dental parameters is consistent as T →∞ , for given N. However, it is inconsistent for given T,a s
N →∞ . The intuition behind this result is that, in the latter case, the number of parameters to
estimate tends to inﬁnity, while the information used to estimate each parameter does not increase.
In my case, given that the panel data sets I am using are very long (N small, T high), the incidental
parameters problem is not an issue.
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The coeﬃcient of the ﬁtted line is 5.02e-07 (robust standard error: 1.50e-07). See also footnote 21.
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This graph covers the whole sample of countries in the WVS.
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This graph covers lower-income countries in the WVS.
The coeﬃcient of the ﬁtted line is 2.87e-06 (robust st.error=6.76e-07). See also footnote 22.





























GDP per capita in 1995, PPP
 Not in labor force subsample  In labor force subsample





not in LF: the coeﬃcient of the ﬁtted line is 1.29e-07 (robust st.error=1.07e-07);
in LF: the coeﬃcient of the ﬁtted line is 6.44e-07 (robust st.error=1.93e-07).
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age -0.0006 -0.0004 -0.0006 -0.0003 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0002
3.47** 2.00* 3.75** 1.94 2.47* 1.72 0.71
male 0.0139 0.0142 0.0141 0.012 0.0097 0.0086 0.0136
3.94** 6.10** 4.08** 3.45** 2.34* 1.76 2.61**
rural -0.0054 -0.009
2.39* 2.28*
parents' foreign citizenship 0.0272 0.0349
5.69** 4.27**
education (years of education) 0.0061 0.0076 0.0065 0.0074
5.25** 5.65** 3.38** 4.44**
log of real income 0.0015
0.39
political affiliation with the right -0.0115 -0.0165
1.97* 1.74
upper social class 0.0024
0.63
trade union member -0.0003
0.06
number of obs 23977 18202 23866 21669 15066 8202 8420
Pseudo R-squared 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.1 0.12 0.1 0.08
The sample excludes all individuals who are not citizens of the country where they are interviewed. 
The table contains the estimated marginal effect on the probability of being pro-immigration, given an increase in the value of the relevant regressor, holding all other regressors at their mean value.
The z statistics values of the marginal effect of each relevant regressor - based on standard errors adjusted for clustering on country -  are presented under each marginal effect.  * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
rural is coded as follows: 1=urban, 2=suburbs/city-town, 3=rural.
parents' foreign citizenship is coded as follows: 1=both parents are citizens; 2= only mother/father is citizen; 3=neither parents are citizens.
log of real income  is calculated using data in local currency on individual yearly income from the ISSP-NI data set and purchasing power parity conversion factors from the WDI (World Bank).
trade union member equals one if the individual is a member of a trade union, zero if he is not.
political affiliation with the right  is coded as follows: 1=far left, 2=centre left, 3=centre, 4=right, 5=far right.
upper social class is coded as follows: 1=lower, 2=working, 3=lower middle, 4=middle, 5=upper middle, 6=upper.
Immig Opinion Dummy
Table 1a: Benchmark Model (ISSP-NI data set)
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age -0.0016 -0.0017 -0.0017 -0.0015
5.02** 5.01** 4.45** 3.99**
male 0.009 0.0059 0.0044 0.0111
1.3 0.77 0.55 1.26
education (educational attainment) 0.0192 0.0176 0.0165 0.0152
5.36** 4.68** 4.07** 3.68**
upper social class 0.012 0.0107 0.0057 0.0039
2.21* 1.72 0.83 0.57
political affiliation with the right -0.0085 -0.0078 -0.0084 -0.0065
3.17** 2.75** 3.09** 2.37*
town size 0.0051 0.006 0.006
1.65 2.01* 1.84
relative income 0.0048 0.0058
2.04* 2.31*
national pride (1) -0.0203
2.49*
national pride (2) -0.03
2.76**
number of obs 36514 30829 26552 23243
Pseudo R-squared 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.07
The table contains the estimated marginal effect on the probability of being pro-immigration, given an increase in the value of the relevant regressor,
holding all other regressors at their mean value.  The z statistics values of the marginal effect of each relevant regressor - based on standard errors 
adjusted for clustering on country -  are presented under each marginal effect.  * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
The sample excludes all individuals who were not born in the country where they are interviewed. 
education (the highest education level attained by the individual) is coded as follows: 1=no formal education; 2=incomplete primary school; 3=complete primary school; 
4=incomplete secondary school (technical/vocational type); 5=complete secondary school (technical/vocational type);
6=incomplete secondary (university/preparatory type); 7=complete secondary (university/preparatory type); 8=some
university-level education, without degree; 9=university-level education, with degree.
upper social class is coded as follows: 1=lower class, 2=working class; 3=lower middle class; 4=upper middle class; 5=upper class.
political affiliation with the right  is coded as follows: in order, from 1 (left-wing) to 10 (right-wing).
town size is coded as follows: in order, from 1=under 2,000 to 8=500,000 and more.
relative income is coded as follows: from 1=lowest decile in the country to 10=highest decile in the country.
national pride (1) is coded as follows:1=not at all proud to be (Italian, for example); 4=very proud to be (Italian, for example).
national pride (2) is coded as follows: 1=if willing to fight in a war for one's own country; 0=if not willing.
Table 1b:  Benchmark Model (WVS data set)
Immig Opinion Dummy (WVS)
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age -0.0003 -0.0005 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0002 -0.0005 -0.0003 -0.0004
2.20* 2.35* 2.80** 2.74** 1.58 4.08** 2.23* 3.14**
male 0.0118 0.0095 0.0093 0.0093 0.0118 0.0101 0.0119 0.0107
3.39** 2.13* 2.17* 2.16* 4.08** 2.68** 3.38** 2.66**
parents' foreign citizenship 0.023 0.0252 0.0242 0.0242 0.0157 0.0277 0.0224 0.023
4.68** 4.25** 4.35** 4.36** 3.82** 6.51** 4.71** 4.59**
education (years of education) -0.0454 -0.0496 -0.0703 -0.0765 -0.0345 -0.0561 -0.1002
4.46** 2.25* 2.83** 2.99** 3.92** 3.18** 2.34*
education*gdp 0.0054 0.0058 0.0079 0.0086 0.004 0.0064 0.0108
4.81** 2.50* 3.10** 3.27** 4.17** 3.46** 2.47*
political affiliation with the right -0.015
2.43*
log of real income 0.002 0.0821
0.54 1.11










number of obs 21581 12507 15001 15001 21581 12999 20487 17717
Pseudo R-squared 0.11 0.11 0.13 0.13 0.16 0.11 0.12 0.12
The sample excludes all individuals who are not citizens of the country where they are interviewed. 
The table contains the estimated marginal effect on the probability of being pro-immigration, given an increase in the value of the relevant regressor, holding all other regressors at their mean value.
The z statistics values of the marginal effect of each relevant regressor - based on standard errors adjusted for clustering on country -  are presented under each marginal effect.  * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
parents' foreign citizenship is coded as follows: 1=both parents are citizens; 2= only mother/father is citizen; 3=neither parents are citizens.
political affiliation with the right  is coded as follows: 1=far left, 2=centre left, 3=centre, 4=right, 5=far right.  gdp is the log of per capita GDP in 1995, PPP (current international dollars) 
log of real income  is calculated using data in local currency on individual income from the ISSP-NI data set and purchasing power parity conversion factors from the WDI (World Bank).
See Appendix 2 for the definition of  Immig Crime and Immig Culture.
skilISCO equals one if the ISCO88 occupation code is 2 (legislators and managers), 3 (professionals) and 4 (technicians); it equals zero if the ISCO 88 occupation code is 5 (clerks), 6 (service and sales workers), 
7 (agricultural and fishery workers), 8 (craft and related trades workers), 9 (plant and machine operators) and 10 (elementary occupations)
Table 2a: Does the link between individual skill and immigration preferences change across countries? (ISSP-NI data set)
Immig Opinion Dummy
2 R 2 REquation 123456














age -0.0016 -0.0015 -0.0021 -0.0018 -0.0023 -0.0023
4.29** 2.14* 5.94** 4.52** 6.89** 5.38**
male 0.0089 -0.0055 0.0059 0.0038 0.003 0.0114
1.3 0.54 0.85 0.52 0.39 1.14
upper social class 0.0134 0.0164 0.0232 0.0196 0.0154 0.0267
2.61** 1.85 3.84** 3.42** 2.68** 3.40**
political affiliation with the right -0.0082 -0.0132 -0.0093 -0.0093 -0.0073 -0.0087
2.88** 1.66 3.02** 2.97** 2.17* 2.49*




education age -0.023 -0.058
(age at which education completed) 3.05** 5.38**
education age*gdp 0.003 0.0075
3.68** 5.98**
individual skill -0.0728




(chief wage earner's occupation-based skill) 1.86
cwe skill*gdp 0.0048
2.10*
number of obs 33371 9966 29918 28745 26371 14256
Pseudo R-squared 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07
The table contains the estimated marginal effect on the probability of being pro-immigration, given an increase in the value of the relevant regressor, holding all other regressors at their mean value.
The z statistics values of the marginal effect of each relevant regressor - based on standard errors adjusted for clustering on country -  are presented under each marginal effect.  * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
The sample excludes all individuals who were not born in the country where they are interviewed.  The countries' sample for regression in column (2) is the same as in the ISSP data set.
upper social class is coded as follows: 1=lower class, 2=working class; 3=lower middle class; 4=upper middle class; 5=upper class.
political affiliation with the right  is coded as follows: in order, from 1 (left-wing) to 10 (right-wing).
See footnote at the end of Table 1b for the definition of education. education age is the age at which the individual finished school.
individual skill is coded as follows: 1=agricultural worker; 2=farmer (own farm); 3=unskilled manual worker; 4=semi-skilled manual worker; 5=skilled manual worker; 6=foreman and supervisor;
7=non manual-office worker (non-supervisory); 8=supervisory-office worker; 9=professional worker (lawyer, accountant, teacher, etc.); 10=employer/manager of 
establishment with less than 10 employees; 11=employer/manager of establishment with 10 or more employees.
cwe (chief wage earner in the household) skill is coded in the same way as individual skill.
Immig Opinion Dummy (WVS)
Table 2b: Does the link between individual skill and immigration preferences change across countries? (WVS data set)
2 R 2 R
2 R 2 REquation 1 2 3
Method probit probit probit
with country dummies with country dummies with country dummies
Dependent variable
Sample Full Sample In Labor Force Not in Labor Force
educyrs -0.0345 -0.0411 -0.0067
(years of education)
3.92** 3.59** 1.54
educyrs*gdp 0.004 0.0048 0.0008
4.17** 3.84** 1.63
Observations 21581 13237 7264
Pseudo R-squared 0.16 0.16 0.15
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.
The labor force subsample includes individuals who are full-time employed, part-time employed, less than part-time 
employed (main job); unemployed.  The out-of-the labor force subsample includes individuals who are retired; 
housewifes (men), in home duties; permanently disabled, sick; others, not in labour force, not working. I exclude 
students from the sample since their number of years of education does not reflect their expected future skill.
Table 2c: Differential Impact of Skill on Immigration-Policy Preferences:
Labor-Force Participants and Non-Labor-Force Participants (ISSP-NI data set)
The regressions in this table, based on the ISSP-NI data set, include as controls age, male, parents' foreign 
citizenship, Immig Crime, Immig Culture and country dummy variables. The z statistic values, under each marginal 
effect, are based on robust standard errors adjusted for clustering on country. 
Immig Opinion DummyEquation 123456789




















age -0.0005 -0.0003 -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0003 -0.0004 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0005
2.68** 2.20* 2.68** 2.67** 2.21* 1.04 0.57 0.56 1.21
male 0.0078 0.0107 0.0078 0.0078 0.0106 -0.0019 0.0004 0.0004 -0.0029
1.58 2.42* 1.6 1.6 2.44* 0.15 0.04 0.03 0.22
parents' foreign citizenship 0.0163 0.01 0.0163 0.0163 0.01 0.0207 0.0117 0.009 0.0194
3.24** 2.26* 3.19** 3.22** 2.25* 2.08* 1.58 1.15 2.07*
education (years of education) -0.0012 -0.002 -0.0245 0.0066 0.0035 0.0085 0.0056 0.0081 -0.3472
1.01 2.23* 0.35 4.32** 3.05** 3.17** 3.07** 3.13** 3.38**








Immigrants/Natives ratio in each 
occupation (IN ratio) -0.2705 -0.1713 -0.4489 -0.1432
3.83** 3.09** 2.04* 1.55
Immig Crime 0.0491 0.0489 0.0389
6.99** 6.99** 4.52**
Immig Culture 0.0489 0.0487 0.0573
4.16** 4.16** 5.05**
willingness to move 0.003
1.48
willingness to move*IN ratio 0.0872
1.57
number of obs 10414 10414 10414 10414 10414 3421 3421 3173 3421
Pseudo R-squared 0.13 0.18 0.13 0.13 0.18 0.13 0.19 0.13 0.14
The sample excludes all individuals who are not citizens of the country where they are interviewed.  The table contains the estimated marginal effect on the probability of being pro-immigration, given an increase in the value
 of the relevant regressor, holding all other regressors at their mean value.  The z statistics values of the marginal effect of each relevant regressor - based on standard errors adjusted for clustering on country -  
are presented under each marginal effect.  * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.
parents' foreign citizenship is coded as follows: 1=both parents are citizens; 2= only mother/father is citizen; 3=neither parents are citizens.
SN is an indicator variable of whether the ratio of skilled to unskilled labor in the native relative to the immigrant populations is greater than 1;  SM is an indicator variable of the same ratio being less than 1.
The variable Immigrants/Natives ratio in each occupation (IN ratio) is equal to the log of one plus the ratio of the number of foreigners to the number of natives in each occupation, in 1995 (the data for foreigners and for natives 
referes to the stock of immigrants and natives in 1995). Willingness to move measures the stated willingness to move to another city/town, in order to improve work or living conditions (1=very unwilling, 5=very willing).
See Appendix 2 for the definition of  Immig Crime and Immig Culture.
Immig Opinion Dummy
Table 3: Factor-Endowments Model (ISSP-NI data set): Additional empirical evidence on the link between individual skill and preferences
The relative skill ratio is the log of one plus the relative skill composition ( RSC). The relative skill composition is the ratio of skilled to unskilled labor in the native relative to the immigrant populations. For both natives and immigrants, the ratio of skilled to unskilled labor is 
measured as the ratio of the number of individuals with levels of education 2 and 3  to the number of individuals with level 1 of education (see footnote 13).  In order to get the semi-elasticity with respect to the RSC, one needs to multiply coefficients' estimates of the  relative skill 
ratio by RSC/(1+RSC).  The skill composition uses data on the stock of immigrants and natives in 1995.
2 R 2 REquation 123456














age -0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0002
1.67 1.53 0.43 2.60** 1.88 2.11*
male 0.0126 0.012 0.0118 0.0116 0.0108 0.0107
3.85** 1.88 2.53* 4.68** 2.80** 4.07**
parents' foreign citizenship 0.0238 0.0204 0.0242 0.0159 0.0239 0.015
4.94** 4.90** 3.78** 10.13** 3.90** 8.32**
education (years of education) 0.0052 0.0079 0.0057 0.0022 0.0064 -0.0251
5.24** 6.26** 4.92** 3.80** 4.84** 1.99*
education*gdp 0.0027
2.11*
monoculturalism -0.0133 -0.0567 0.0011
2.03* 2.36* 0.38












national pride (1) -0.0011
0.26
national pride (2) -0.0119 -0.0054
5.21** 3.16**
national pride (3) -0.0064
2.14*
national pride (4) -0.0044
1.62
against illegal immigrants -0.0203 -0.0179
7.22** 7.45**
in favor of political refugees 0.0186 0.0168
6.42** 6.52**
major ethnic group -0.0031
0.43
number of obs 21581 9667 16130 14750 18024 14473
Pseudo R-squared 0.12 0.17 0.11 0.21 0.1 0.22
The sample excludes all individuals who are not citizens of the country where they are interviewed.  The table contains the estimated marginal effect on the probability of being pro-immigration, given an increase in
the value of the relevant regressor, holding all other regressors at their mean value.  The z statistics values of the marginal effect of each relevant regressor - based on standard errors adjusted for clustering
on country -  are presented under each marginal effect.  * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.  parents' foreign citizenship is coded as follows: 1=both parents are citizens; 2= only mother/father is citizen; 3=neither parents are citizens.
The variable against illegal immigrants is higher (from 1 to 5) the more the respondent agrees with the following statement: "(R's country) should take stronger measures to exclude illegal immigrants." The variable  in favor of political refugees  is higher 
(from 1 to 5) the more the respondent agrees with the statement that refugees who have suffered political repression in their own country should be allowed to stay in (R's country). The variable  major ethnic group equals 1 if the respondent belongs 
to the dominant ethnic group in his country; it equals 0 otherwise. See Appendix 4 and Mayda and Rodrik (2002) for the definition of  town, county, country, continent, national pride (1)-(4) .
Immig Opinion Dummy
Table 4a:  Non-Economic Determinants Model (ISSP-NI data set)
The variable multiculturalism (monoculturalism) is an indicator variable of answer 1 (2) to the following question: "Some people say that it is better for a country if different racial and ethnic groups maintain their distinct customs and traditions. Others say 
that it is better if these groups adapt and blend into the larger society. Which of these views comes closer to your own? 1. It is better for society if groups maintain their distinct customs and traditions; 2. It is better if groups adapt and blend into the larger 
society." For each destination country, religious difference measures the dissimilarity between natives and immigrants, in terms of religious affiliation.
2 R 2 REquation 1 2 3








age -0.0016 -0.0015 -0.0016
4.82** 4.17** 4.29**
male 0.0097 0.0096 0.0089
1.38 1.37 1.3
upper social class 0.0119 0.0134 0.0134
2.19* 2.61** 2.61**
political affiliation with the right -0.0081 -0.0078 -0.0082
3.10** 2.84** 2.88**






number of obs 36514 33371 33371
Pseudo R-squared 0.07 0.07 0.07
The table contains the estimated marginal effect on the probability of being pro-immigration, given an increase
in the value of the relevant regressor, holding all other regressors at their mean value.
The z statistics values of the marginal effect of each relevant regressor - based on standard errors adjusted for clustering 
on country -  are presented under each marginal effect.  * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
The sample excludes all individuals who were not born in the country where they are interviewed.
upper social class is coded as follows: 1=lower class, 2=working class; 3=lower middle class; 4=upper middle class; 5=upper class.
political affiliation with the right  is coded as follows: in order, from 1 (left-wing) to 10 (right-wing).
See footnote at the end of Table 1b for the definition of education.
The variable racist is equal to 1 if, given the question "On this list are various groups of people. Could you please sort out any
that you would not like to have as neighbours?", the respondent mentions "People of a different race"; it equals 0 otherwise.
Immig Opinion Dummy (WVS)
Table 4b:  Non-Economic Determinants Model (WVS data set)Equation 123456














age -0.0003 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0006 -0.0004 -0.0007
2.20* 0.49 0.43 1.27 0.97 1.55
male 0.0118 0.0099 0.0095 0.0787 0.0797 0.0809
3.39** 2.11* 2.14* 5.74** 5.59** 7.61**
parents' foreign citizenship 0.023 0.0235 0.0254 0.0194 0.0203 0.0301
4.68** 4.58** 4.87** 2.13* 2.14* 3.96**
education (years of education) -0.0454 0.0063 0.0061 0.0191 0.0193 -0.127
4.46** 4.24** 4.30** 5.81** 5.99** 3.99**
education*gdp 0.0054 0.0154
4.81** 4.71**
non-traded sector 0.0049 0.0305
1.06 2.05*
CA (comparatively-advantaged) sector -0.0043 -0.0133
0.66 0.53
CD (comparatively-disadvantaged) sector -0.0124 -0.0306
2.09* 2.26*
number of obs 21581 10707 11365 12429 11675 23415
Pseudo R-squared 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.06 0.07 0.08
The sample excludes all individuals who are not citizens of the country where they are interviewed, in both regressions with Immig Opinion Dummy and Trade Opinion Dummy as dependent variables.
The table contains the estimated marginal effect on the probability of being pro-immigration, given an increase in the value of the relevant regressor, holding all other regressors at their mean value.
The z statistics values of the marginal effect of each relevant regressor - based on standard errors adjusted for clustering on country -  are presented under each marginal effect.  * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.
parents' foreign citizenship is coded as follows: 1=both parents are citizens; 2= only mother/father is citizen; 3=neither parents are citizens.
A sector is defined as a CA (comparatively-advantaged) sector if its adjusted net imports are less than zero and as a CD (comparatively disadvantaged) sector if its adjusted net imports are greater than zero.
Trade Opinion Dummy Immig Opinion Dummy
Table 5: Immigration vs Trade Preferences (ISSP-NI data set)
























































































































Germany West 46.290 23.430 17.630 2.040 0.490 8.820 1.310 1.743 20 0.028 18
Germany East 51.630 20.260 16.830 1.140 0.650 8.660 0.820 1.662 21 0.020 20
Great Britain 40.100 23.770 25.890 2.800 1.060 5.700 0.680 1.942 16 0.041 14
USA 29.690 25.190 21.830 4.580 2.140 12.600 3.970 2.092 12 0.081 9
Austria 28.360 24.720 37.740 2.930 0.810 5.450 0.000 2.187 8 0.039 15
Hungary 55.950 24.190 13.510 0.710 0.710 4.640 0.300 1.591 23 0.015 22
Italy 41.760 30.310 19.870 2.560 0.820 4.580 0.090 1.850 17 0.036 16
Ireland 6.630 13.560 55.350 15.600 2.240 6.520 0.100 2.928 1 0.191 2
Netherlands 26.370 30.990 30.790 4.420 0.680 6.220 0.530 2.164 9 0.055 13
Norway 29.530 29.260 27.320 5.700 1.210 6.240 0.740 2.138 10 0.074 10
Sweden 35.660 29.250 21.880 4.130 2.110 6.730 0.240 2.009 14 0.067 11
Czech Republic 39.750 25.750 21.140 1.900 0.270 11.020 0.180 1.842 18 0.024 19
Slovenia 29.920 29.920 31.760 1.350 0.390 6.660 0.000 2.061 13 0.019 21
Poland 25.920 17.530 19.910 4.130 1.820 29.740 0.940 2.111 11 0.086 6
Bulgaria 32.580 17.190 9.770 2.170 1.540 36.470 0.270 1.781 19 0.059 12
Russia 16.080 22.150 22.280 3.990 1.460 34.050 0.000 2.281 5 0.083 8
New Zealand 26.790 31.650 24.060 8.590 2.220 5.260 1.420 2.226 6 0.116 4
Canada 16.480 20.580 32.890 12.170 5.990 11.430 0.470 2.666 2 0.206 1
Philippines 31.910 27.140 25.630 7.200 3.770 4.360 0.000 2.203 7 0.115 5
Japan 13.380 21.820 35.030 10.110 2.950 16.480 0.240 2.609 3 0.157 3
Spain 8.770 26.640 45.490 6.390 1.070 11.640 0.000 2.596 4 0.084 7
Latvia 49.740 20.050 17.190 0.260 0.130 12.500 0.130 1.638 22 0.004 23
Slovak Republic 30.220 24.510 24.300 1.810 0.650 18.510 0.000 1.996 15 0.030 17
 Mean  29.600 24.590 26.270 4.820 1.600 12.560 0.560 2.128 0.074
Standard Deviation 1.007 0.262
The sample excludes all individuals who are not citizens of the country where they are interviewed. 
The second column of the last three variables gives the ranking of countries according to that variable.
Bold numbers correspond to highest and lowest values.
In the definition of Immig Opinion, missing values include "can't choose" and NA responses.
Immig Opinion Dummy=1 if Immig Opinion=4 or 5; 0 if Immig Opinion=1,2 or 3; can't choose and NA are missing values. 
Immig Opinion gives responses to the following question: "Do you think the number of immigrants to (R's country) nowadays should be ...": reduced a lot (1), reduced a little (2), remain the same as it is (3), increased a little (4), 
increased a lot (5).
















































































































Germany West 15.130 23.710 18.490 26.830 9.520 6.320 2.913 3 0.388 2 0.415 20
Germany East 25.980 30.390 16.990 17.320 4.740 4.580 2.418 11 0.231 13 0.591 13
Great Britain 23.160 40.170 18.530 12.380 1.420 4.350 2.255 16 0.144 18 0.662 10
USA 21.290 43.090 16.020 10.390 2.930 6.290 2.259 16 0.142 19 0.687 7
Austria 37.840 31.980 10.920 12.610 3.870 2.780 2.102 20 0.170 15 0.718 5
Hungary 45.400 25.800 15.800 6.900 2.600 3.500 1.917 21 0.098 22 0.738 4
Italy 25.780 34.730 14.530 16.090 6.580 2.290 2.416 12 0.232 12 0.619 12
Ireland 24.250 41.350 10.870 19.620 2.720 1.210 2.344 14 0.226 14 0.664 9
Netherlands 5.120 23.930 28.240 31.930 5.510 5.270 3.092 1 0.395 1 0.307 23
Norway 9.100 28.490 27.370 22.790 4.910 7.330 2.848 4 0.299 4 0.406 21
Sweden 12.420 28.090 29.240 17.520 6.400 6.330 2.759 5 0.255 10 0.432 19
Czech Republic 25.560 26.550 17.730 17.190 9.540 3.420 2.571 8 0.277 6 0.540 17
Slovenia 24.030 26.830 17.950 20.460 3.960 6.760 2.501 9 0.262 7 0.546 15
Poland 30.040 34.860 12.700 11.760 2.630 8.010 2.153 18 0.156 17 0.705 6
Bulgaria 53.570 23.800 4.980 3.260 4.520 9.860 1.684 23 0.086 23 0.858 1
Russia 35.580 24.480 11.740 15.020 6.810 6.370 2.284 15 0.233 11 0.642 11
New Zealand 17.640 34.230 19.370 19.850 4.990 3.930 2.587 7 0.258 8 0.540 16
Canada 14.130 31.690 21.580 21.840 6.030 4.730 2.727 6 0.293 5 0.481 18
Philippines 12.750 53.750 16.330 15.170 0.830 1.170 2.368 13 0.162 16 0.673 8
Japan 14.090 16.800 29.540 14.970 19.030 5.570 3.085 2 0.360 3 0.327 22
Spain 21.210 50.120 10.970 9.250 0.980 7.450 2.121 19 0.111 21 0.771 2
Latvia 50.190 20.790 9.870 9.000 4.120 6.030 1.894 22 0.140 20 0.755 3
Slovak Republic 26.660 28.750 15.990 16.140 8.570 3.890 2.493 10 0.257 10 0.576 15
 Mean  23.570 31.220 17.800 16.660 5.480 5.260 2.464 0.234 0.578
Standard Deviation 1.202 0.423 0.494
The second column of each variable gives the ranking of countries according to that variable.
Bold numbers correspond to highest and lowest values.
Trade Opinion Dummy:  Trade Opinion Dummy=1 if Trade Opinion=4 or 5; 0 if Trade Opinion=1,2,3.
Trade Opinion Dummy (against):  Trade Opinion Dummy (against)=1 if Trade Opinion=1 or 2; 0 if Trade Opinion=3,4,5.
Data Appendix 1b: Summary Data on Individual Preferences on Trade Policy (ISSP-NI data set)
Trade Opinion gives responses to the following question: "Now we would like to ask a few questions about relations between (R's country) and other countries. How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements: (R's country) should limit the 








OpinionGermany West 0.028 18 0.207 10 0.336 6 0.428 7 0.618 5
Germany East 0.020 20 0.132 18 0.292 9 0.260 14 0.500 10
Great Britain 0.041 14 0.363 6 0.152 16 0.232 17 0.509 9
USA 0.081 9 0.332 7 0.292 10 0.251 15 0.566 6
Austria 0.039 15 0.182 13 0.393 4 0.348 11 0.429 15
Hungary 0.015 22 0.098 22 0.078 23 0.164 22 0.179 23
Italy 0.036 16 0.207 9 0.212 13 0.452 5 0.428 16
Ireland 0.191 2 0.678 1 0.551 2 0.439 6 0.743 3
Netherlands 0.055 13 0.322 8 0.151 17 0.416 8 0.562 7
Norway 0.074 10 0.100 21 0.111 20 0.473 4 0.466 13
Sweden 0.067 11 0.149 16 0.227 12 0.494 3 0.646 4
Czech Republic 0.024 19 0.150 15 0.079 22 0.322 12 0.207 21
Slovenia 0.019 21 0.206 11 0.189 14 0.195 21 0.271 17
Poland 0.086 6 0.115 20 0.304 7 0.203 20 0.440 14
Bulgaria 0.059 12 0.062 23 0.127 18 0.105 23 0.248 18
Russia 0.083 8 0.172 14 0.159 15 0.243 16 0.245 19
New Zealand 0.116 4 0.387 5 0.468 3 0.304 13 0.749 2
Canada 0.206 1 0.527 2 0.605 1 0.529 2 0.773 1
Philippines 0.115 5 0.482 4 0.297 8 0.396 9 0.486 11
Japan 0.157 3 0.146 17 0.363 5 0.542 1 0.467 12
Spain 0.084 7 0.500 3 0.245 11 0.369 10 0.552 8
Latvia 0.004 23 0.199 12 0.126 19 0.217 19 0.215 20
Slovak Republic 0.030 17 0.124 19 0.087 21 0.218 18 0.189 22
 Mean  0.074 0.255 0.251 0.339 0.462
Standard Deviation 0.262 0.436 0.434 0.473 0.499
The sample excludes all individuals who are not citizens of the country where they are interviewed.  The second column of each variable gives the ranking of countries according to that variable. Bold numbers correspond to highest and lowest values.
Immig Opinion Dummy=1 if Immig Opinion=4 or 5; 0 if Immig Opinion=1,2 or 3; can't choose and NA are missing values. 
Immig Crime=1 if Immig Crime Opinion=4 or 5; 0 otherwise.  Immig Economy=1 if Immig Economy Opinion=4 or 5; 0 otherwise.  Immig Jobs=1 if Immig Jobs Opinion=1 or 2; 0 otherwise.  Immig Culture=1 if Immig Culture Opinion=4 or 5; 0 otherwise. 
Immig Opinion gives responses to the following question: "Do you think the number of immigrants to (R's country) nowadays should be ...": 1=reduced a lot, reduced a little, remain the same as it is, increased a little, 5=increased a lot.
Immig Crime Opinion gives responses to the following question: How much do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements?  Immigrants increase crime rates.  (1=agree strongly; 5=disagree strongly)
Immig Economy Opinion gives responses to the following question: How much do you agree or disagree with the following statement?  Immigrants are generally good for (R's country's) economy (disagree strongly=1;agree strongly=5)
Immig Jobs Opinion gives responses to the following question: How much do you agree or disagree with the following statement?  Immigrants take jobs away from people who were born in (R's country) (disagree strongly=1;agree strongly=5)
Immig Culture Opinion gives responses to the following question: How much do you agree or disagree with each of the following statement?  Immigrants make (R's country) more open to new ideas and cultures (disagree strongly=1;agree strongly=5).
Data Appendix 2: Summary Data on Individual Preferences on Immigration Policy (ISSP-NI data set)
Immigrants generally good 
for economy
Immigrants do not take jobs 
away from people
Immigr make the country 
more open to new ideas and 
cultures
Immig Opinion Dummy Immig Economy Immig Jobs Immig Culture



























































































Germany West 1225 47 10.909 0.536 - 0.378 2.02 0 16.9 61.36 18.31 1.41 0.35 51.18 5.94 39.65 2.88
Germany East 612 48 10.950 0.503 - 0.799 9.96 0 37.14 47.83 4.71 0.36 16.79 48.01 5.6 28.16 1.44
Great Britain 1035 47 11.321 0.403 - 0.216 ------0.68 51.03 17.12 31.16 0
USA 1310 45 13.426 0.430 1.596 0.162 5.69 46.12 0 44.89 0 3.31 0 34.71 36.42 28.87 0
Austria 991 47 10.355 0.453 - 0.462 3.95 0 16.45 65.38 13.35 0.85 0 51.35 6.1 42.55 0
Hungary 992 48 10.491 0.427 1.969 0.148 13.14 36.29 26.17 23.15 1.25 0 -----
Italy 1092 43 11.028 0.483 1.982 0.338 1.37 0 11.54 71.25 13.37 2.47 -----
Ireland 981 46 12.249 0.489 2.015 0.263 1.72 37.2 14.84 41.08 4.62 0.54 0 6.37 91.25 2.39 2.39
Netherlands 2059 44 12.685 0.454 1.724 0.215 ------9.38 26.1 37.79 22.74 3.99
Norway 1490 43 12.663 0.499 2.097 0.484 0 35.62 7.72 46.26 9.77 0.63 0.78 49.31 24.48 25.43 0
Sweden 1234 45 11.411 0.495 1.241 0.729 2.27 37.31 0 49.69 9.94 0.78 8.28 46.71 19.84 25.17 0
Czech Republic 1107 43 12.911 0.508 1.648 0.330 4.36 28.63 22.27 36.68 6.73 1.33 5.93 12.47 45.11 26.09 10.4
Slovenia 1036 43 10.677 0.440 2.031 0.380 3.6 37.35 0 52.06 6.77 0.21 0 13.58 28.61 52.02 5.78
Poland 1597 47 10.287 0.447 1.724 0.148 7.79 43.53 0 41.68 4.69 2.31 0 63.32 24.34 12.34 0
Bulgaria 1105 49 - 0.476 1.916 0.193 15.59 55.28 0 28.07 0 1.06 14.67 36.89 19.78 22 6.67
Russia 1580 45 11.187 0.449 1.505 0.619 14.95 34.61 17.08 29.23 3.31 0.81 26.24 4.52 11.58 51.4 6.24
New Zealand 989 46 14.310 0.473 1.498 0.212 3.97 21.85 12.27 46.96 13.9 1.05 0 6.12 86.03 7.85 0
Canada 1487 42 14.761 0.486 1.157 0.333 3.48 21.66 13.55 41.89 17.47 1.96 1.3 30.59 45.74 22.37 0
Philippines 1194 40 9.393 0.502 1.747 0.019 24.87 61.47 0 10.89 0 2.76 -----
Japan 1256 46 11.868 0.458 - 0.308 4.79 0 20.7 52.27 18.48 3.76 4.5 13.92 16.7 64.88 0
Spain 1220 45 10.127 0.476 1.480 0.084 6.28 42.13 18.01 29.4 3.85 0.34 16 43.77 0.34 39.89 0
Latvia 768 46 11.611 0.389 1.938 0.197 14.2 48.49 24.92 0 11.63 0.76 -----
Slovak Republic 1383 41 11.836 0.484 - 0.322 8.92 32.01 22.79 27.66 6.9 1.72 6.73 18.02 49.01 17.43 8.81
 Mean  total n=27,743 44.809 11.675 0.468 1.703 0.313 7.24 30.51 12.36 40.54 7.89 1.45 6.14 32.95 28.87 29.49 2.56
Standard Deviation 16.913 3.572 0.499 0.898 0.464
The sample excludes all individuals who are not citizens of the country where they are interviewed. 
Rural is coded as follows: 1 urban, 2 suburbs/city-town, 3 rural.
Male is coded as follows: 1 male, 0 female (i.e., missing values are excluded).
Trade Union Membership is coded as follows: 1 member, 0 non member (i.e., missing values are excluded).
Both Upper Social Class and Political Affiliation with the Right  give percentages after missing values have been excluded.




political affiliation with the 
right






educationGermany West 0.384 23 0.585 19 0.498 16 0.736 20 0.644 21 0.345 15 0.292 17
Germany East 0.456 22 0.668 15 0.490 17 0.761 19 0.691 18 0.322 18 0.250 21
Great Britain 0.500 20 0.449 23 0.180 22 0.631 23 0.715 14 0.527 9 0.491 7
USA 0.587 16 0.593 18 0.534 11 0.783 18 0.911 1 0.796 2 0.423 8
Austria 0.513 19 0.870 3 0.655 6 0.899 9 0.839 8 0.655 6 0.578 3
Hungary 0.838 4 0.848 4 0.928 1 0.963 1 0.855 5 0.241 21 0.372 13
Italy 0.815 6 0.794 7 0.680 5 0.873 13 0.614 22 0.361 13 0.293 16
Ireland 0.799 7 0.797 6 0.427 18 0.909 6 0.865 4 0.703 5 0.619 2
Netherlands 0.691 12 0.483 22 0.523 13 0.857 15 0.487 23 0.439 11 0.264 19
Norway 0.684 13 0.771 8 0.523 12 0.931 3 0.774 11 0.647 7 0.362 15
Sweden 0.575 17 0.621 17 0.322 19 0.795 16 0.689 19 0.437 12 0.409 10
Czech Republic 0.721 10 0.659 16 0.731 3 0.896 10 0.710 16 0.206 23 0.290 18
Slovenia 0.817 5 0.767 9 0.646 8 0.920 5 0.754 12 0.256 20 0.253 20
Poland 0.467 21 0.584 20 0.612 9 0.903 8 0.839 7 0.332 17 0.399 12
Bulgaria 0.884 2 0.842 5 0.777 2 0.907 7 0.849 6 0.494 10 0.622 1
Russia 0.651 14 0.583 21 0.162 23 0.784 17 0.697 17 0.358 14 0.525 5
New Zealand 0.740 8 0.679 13 0.511 15 0.929 4 0.810 9 0.753 3 0.495 6
Canada 0.740 9 0.727 10 0.514 14 0.729 21 0.780 10 0.748 4 0.405 11
Philippines 0.717 11 0.669 14 0.321 20 0.665 22 0.878 3 0.590 8 0.363 14
Japan 0.871 3 0.875 2 0.651 7 0.936 2 0.883 2 0.827 1 0.174 23
Spain 0.920 1 0.902 1 0.607 10 0.892 11 0.722 13 0.339 16 0.557 4
Latvia 0.552 18 0.685 12 0.301 21 0.863 14 0.714 15 0.273 19 0.418 9
Slovak Republic 0.594 15 0.716 11 0.720 4 0.877 12 0.679 20 0.216 22 0.217 22
 whole sample  0.676 0.692 0.533 0.845 0.749 0.477 0.390
The sample excludes all individuals who are not citizens of the country where they are interviewed. 
The second column of each variable gives the ranking of countries according to that variable.
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Sweden  0.2545* 












 whole sample  0.2143*
The sample excludes all individuals who are not citizens of the country where they are interviewed. 
 All coefficients significant at the 5% level or better are starred.
Data Appendix 5a: Correlation between Trade 
Opinion and Immig Opinion (ISSP data set)
Country
Correlation between Trade 
Opinion and Immig Opinion 
(ISSP)
Immig Opinion gives responses to the following question: "Do you think the number of immigrants to (R's country)
nowadays should be ...": reduced a lot, reduced a little, remain the same as it is, increased a little, increased a lot.
Trade Opinion gives responses to the following question: "How much do you agree or disagree with the following
statements: (R's country) should limitthe import of foreignproducts in order to protect its nationaleconomy."(1=agree




S.Africa 0.2521*  
USA 0.2968*
Taiwan 0.1885*  
India 0.4372*  
Finland 0.2456*  
Germany East 0.3682*
Sweden 0.0919*
Turkey 0.2224*  
Venezuela 0.0625*
Lithuania 0.2015*  
China 0.1969*































The sample excludes all individuals who were not born in the country where they are interviewed.
 All coefficients significant at the 5% level or better are starred.
Country
Correlation between Trade 
Opinion Dummy and Immig 
Opinion Dummy (WVS)
See footnote 17 for the definition of Immig Opinion Dummy (WVS). Trade Opinion Dummy (WVS) equals 1 if the individual answers 1. to the following question, 0 if 2 (Don't Knows 
are coded as missing values): Do you think it is better if: 1. Goods made in other countries can be imported and sold here if people want to buy them; OR that: 2. There should be stricter 
limits on selling foreign goods here, to protect the jobs of people in this country; OR: 9. Don't Know.Philippines 0.249 0.008











































total mean 0.533 0.041
standard deviation 0.499 0.197
country
Immig Opinion Dummy 
(WVS)
Don't Knows
Data Appendix 6: World Value Survey Summary Statistics of 
Immigration Policy Preferences
Immig Opinion Dummy (WVS) equals 1 if the individual answered a. or b. to the immigration-related question, 0 
if c. or d.; "Don't Knows" are missing values.
The immigration-related question asks: "How about people from other countries coming here to work.  Which 
one of the following do you think the government should do?
a. Let anyone come who wants to; b. Let people come as long as there are jobs available; c. Place strict limits on 
the number of foreigners who can come here; d. Prohibit people coming here from other countries. 
The second column gives the percentages of Don't Knows answers out of the total sample (the total sample is 


























































Data Appendix 7: Per capita GDP of the countries in the ISSP and WVS 
samples
country
per capita GDP in 1995 
(PPP-adjusted)
log of per capita GDP in 
1995 (PPP-adjusted)Country IMS_OECD
OECD 









Australia 87,428 87,400 87,400 87,430 18,063,000 0.0048
Belgium 53,138 53,100 53,100 53,140 10,137,000 0.0052
Britain 55,480 55,500 206,300 206,310 58,606,000 0.0035
Canada 212,249 212,200 212,900 212,870 29,354,000 0.0073
Denmark 0 0 33,000 32,970 5,228,000 0.0063
Finland 7,345 7,300 7,300 7,350 5,108,000 0.0014
France 56,739 56,700 77,000 77,000 57,847,000 0.0013
Hungary 13,200 13,190 10,230,000 0.0013
Ireland 13,600 3,602,000 0.0038
Germany 788,337 788,300 788,300 788,340 81,642,000 0.0097
Japan 209,869 209,900 209,900 209,870 125,440,000 0.0017
Luxembourg 9,591 9,600 9,600 409,500 0.0234
Netherlands 66,972 67,000 67,000 66,970 15,460,000 0.0043
Norway 16,482 16,500 16,500 16,480 4,360,000 0.0038
S.Korea 173,150 44,995,000 0.0038
Sweden 36,079 36,100 36,100 36,080 8,831,000 0.0041
Switzerland 87,894 87,900 87,900 87,890 7,041,000 0.0125
USA 720,459 720,500 720,500 720,460 264,800,000 0.0027
The ratio immigration flow/pop  (in 1995) is calculated using World Bank data for both immigrant flows and population 
(except for Luxembourg, for which data on immigrant flows are from Trends in International Migration.
Data Appendix 8 - Immigration inflows into higher-income countries (1995)